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Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,1 cost-benefit analysis (CBA) proponents
urged the Supreme Court to strike down section 109 of the Clean Air Act2 under a constitutional
doctrine not used since the end of the Lochner-era, the nondelegation doctrine, or to create a
canon of statutory construction favoring CBA to avoid the nondelegation issue. Their argument
for a cost-benefit canon portrayed regulation aiming to protect public health as irrational,
because of the one-sidedness of the health protection principle.3 By asking the Court to base its
ruling on its views of the reasonableness of section 109’s health protection principle, they
sought, in essence, to revive an approach that prevailed during the Lochner period, when the
Court discredited itself by using dubious substantive due process theories to strike down
regulatory schemes that it found unreasonable.4 Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe
implicitly recognized that some of the CBA proponents’ arguments sounded in Lochnerism, for
his brief for General Electric disclaimed any reliance on substantive due process to avoid the
taint emanating from the Lochner line of cases.5

1

531 U.S. 457 (2001)
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
3
See, e.g., Brief of General Electric as Amicus Curiae in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 22,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (arguing that administrative decisions that do
not take costs and risk trade-offs into account are not reasoned); Brief of Respondents Appalachian Power Company
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 4, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426)
(evaluation of tradeoffs are part of “any sound risk management decision”).
4
See infra, notes 237-244 and accompanying text; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW
123-125 (1988) (explaining that Lochner has become an exemplar of a malfunctioning Supreme Court).
5
GE Brief at 18, n. 37 (stating that “it would not necessarily be irrational to the point of
unconstitutionality for Congress” to preclude agency consideration of cost); Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.
Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (referring to the “general disrepute” of
Lochnerism); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U.
L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (both academics and judges until quite recently treated Lochner as a “central” example “of
how courts should not decide constitutional cases”). Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1362 (2000) (suggesting that that wholesale abandonment of substantive due process review may be unfortunate,
even if Lochner itself is problematic). The author’s brief for the United States Public Interest Research Group
(USPIRG) Education Fund in the American Trucking case addressed many of Professor Tribe’s arguments for GE.
This Article expresses the author’s opinion, not that of the USPIRG Education Fund.
2
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The CBA proponents deployed these arguments for Lochnerian activism attacking Clean
Air Act section 109,6 which requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate
national ambient air quality standards protecting public health. This provision reflects a specific
value choice, favoring public health protection over competing economic considerations.7
Accordingly, the American Trucking Court held that enactment of section 109 did not violate the
nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits Congressional delegation of legislative authority.8 The
Court also rejected CBA proponents’ request to construe section 109 to require consideration of
cost.9 In essence, the Court’s decision recognized that the Constitution does not prohibit onesided legislation.10
This article examines a question suggested by Professor Tribe’s brief. To what extent
does modern regulatory reform rely upon Lochnerian views of legislation? The diversity of
scholarly views about what precisely Lochnerism was about makes this question difficult to
answer.11 One frequently lamented Lochnerian vice, judicial misinterpretation of the
Constitution, has played at most a very minor role in the regulatory reform debate. Yet,
Lochnerian views about legislation, which played an important role in that period’s
6

42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Congress deliberately
decided to subordinate health and feasibility concerns to health protection goals).
8
American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (finding the “scope of discretion § 109(b)(1) allows well
within the outer limits” of the Court’s nondelegation doctrine precedent).
9
Id. at 464-71.
10
This point emerged more clearly in oral argument than in the Court’s written opinion. American
Trucking Associations argued that the Court could solve the problem of section 109 being unintelligible by requiring
EPA to consider costs. See Christopher H. Schroeder, The Story of American Trucking: The Blockbuster Case that
Misfired, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 344 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds. 2005). This argument
did not persuade the Court, because, as Justice Scalia said during the oral argument, adding more factors -i.e.
creating balance - does not “bring more certainty to the statute.” Id. The Court’s ruling requires intelligible
legislative principles, not legislative neutrality or balance.
11
See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B. U. L. REV. 881, 881-82
(2005) (describing the shift from looking at Lochnerism as a product of commitment to laissez-faire economics to a
view of Lochnerism as a set of obstacles to class legislation); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 373, 374 (2003) (stating that while nearly all agree that Lochner is a “pariah” there is “no consensus on
why it was wrong”).
7
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jurisprudence, play a central role in the regulatory reform debate, as this Article will show. Both
the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers derive their views from economic theory
with natural law origins. Both Lochnerism and regulatory reform share skepticism of legislative
value choices and implicitly embrace the idea that legislation should be neutral.12 The
skepticism of legislation that both share leads to remarkably similar demands for hyperrationality in regulatory decisions. And both equate CBA with rationality.
Examining the link between modern regulatory reform and Lochnerism brings the arcane
regulatory reform debate into a broader constitutional and administrative law context.
Regulatory reformers’ arguments serve a Lochnerian vision of neutral largely value-free
legislative decisions. This article argues that such a view of legislation is out of place in the
post-Lochner administrative state, as American Trucking implicitly recognized.
Part one provides relevant background on CBA. Part two discusses Lochnerism. Part
three draws parallels between various aspects of Lochnerism and modern regulatory reform. Part
four develops the implications of these parallels for the regulatory reform debate.
I. CBA: An Introduction
Calls for regulatory reform have greatly influenced government in recent years.13
Regulatory reformers have argued that we need much more emphasis on CBA and much less on
12

Cushman, supra note 11, at 886 (“legal commentators writing about the Lochner era” viewed due
process doctrine as “suffused with norms of neutrality, equality, and generality.”); Matthew D. Adler, Rational
Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional Law: Does the Constitution Require Basic or Strengthened
Public Rationality?, in LINKING POLITICS AND LAW (Christoph Engel & Adrienne Heritier eds. 2003) 120 (arguing
that Congress does not choose values, just actions).
13
See Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 34 (1998); Stephen F.
Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257 (2000) (a defense of CBA by a D.C. Circuit judge);
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 1532 (2000)) (requiring CBA of extremely expensive measures); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes:
Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1418-19 (2005) (contrasting
Congressional skepticism toward CBA in the 1960s and 1970s with recent attitudes toward it). See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 307 (1996) (concluding that “[t]he regulatory state is becoming something like a cost-benefit state”).
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health protective policies, like the policy found in section 109 of the Clean Air Act.14 This
section defines CBA and reviews some of its history.
A. CBA: A Definition
CBA of a proposed rule requires a regulator to compare compliance costs to the harms a
rule will avoid, which most writers refer to as benefits.15 In order to facilitate this comparison,
CBA requires the analyst to express the value of the avoided harms in dollar terms to the extent
possible.16 This analysis of avoided harm requires two steps. The regulator must undertake a
quantitative risk assessment to estimate the number of deaths and illnesses and the amount of
environmental harm a regulation will avoid.17 The regulator must then assign a dollar value to
each death, habitat saved, illness avoided, etc.18 Using these two steps the regulator can, in
principle, estimate the value of some of a regulation’s benefits in dollar terms.
The first step, quantitative risk assessment, usually proves impossible for all
environmental effects and many health effects as well.19 Data gaps and a lack of basic scientific

14

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 308
(1999) (the Clean Air Act has been subject to “telling criticism” for its failure to balance costs and benefits).
15
See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 560-61 & n. 67 (1997) (distinguishing harm avoidance from benefit
creation).
16
See FRANK ACKERMAN AND LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING, 39 (2004) (CBA requires reducing benefits of environmental protection
to “dollar values.”); William H. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193 (1980) (defining CBA as a comparison between costs and
benefits in dollar terms). Cf. Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24
HOUS. L. REV. 97, 101 (1987) (comparing CBA in the narrow sense employed here with a broader definition of
CBA).
17
McGarity, supra note 13, at 12 (CBA in the health and environmental context begins with
quantitative risk assessment).
18
Rodgers, supra note 16, at 193 (CBA “seeks to reduce all concerns to a common denominator-the
dollar”).
19
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13 (2004) (many of the major
rules OMB has reviewed in the last 10 years “have important non-quantified” benefits and costs). See, e.g., Amy
Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat
Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 180-183 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy
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understanding often preclude even crude estimation of the amount of death, illness, and
environmental destruction a particular regulation will avoid.20 When estimation proves possible,
uncertainties often lead to an enormous range of scientifically plausible benefits estimates.21
CBA advocates tend to equate all of this quantification with objectivity.22 But risk
assessment and monetization require policy decisions in order to extrapolate risk estimates from
limited data and to assign dollar values to particular consequences.23
CBA supporters have varying positions about what role CBA should play in the
regulatory process. 24 Sometimes they advocate the “indeterminate position,” which simply

Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341, 2351-52 (2002) (discussing serious health effects associated with arsenic that EPA could
not quantify).
20
See Richard W. Parker, Grading Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1382, 1389-1400 (2003)
(providing numerous examples of failure to count non-quantifiable benefits); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTBENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 12 (2002) (“quantification will be . . . impossible in
some cases.”).
21
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. J. 2255, 2257 (2002) (finding that a
“benefits range” sometimes proves so “exceedingly wide” that it does little to “discipline judgment”).
22
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 16, at 35 (“. . . cost-benefit analysis presents itself
as the soul of rationality, an impartial, objective standard for good decisions.”). See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN,
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2000) (selling cost-benefit analysis by referring
repeatedly to “a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test”) [emphasis added].
23
David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 72 COLO. L. REV. 336, 403-05 (2006). See
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 16, at 61-90, 179-203 (identifying and critiquing some of the value choices
made in monetization); Henry Richardson, The Stupidity of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 972
(2000) (finding many of the value choices implicit in CBA “stupid”). See, e.g., Parker, supra note 20, at 1370-75
(critiquing methodologies used to value life and uses of discount rates); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999) (discussing
the value choices involved in discounting); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L. J. 1911 (1999) (same) ;
Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999) (same); Thomas O. McGarity,
Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 171 (1983) (arguing that “wage premiums” are not set by willingness to accept risk,
but by the unemployment rate and the level of desperation of currently employed workers). Cf. McGarity, supra
note 19, at 2353-54 (discussing EPA’s failure to adjust death valuations to account for numerous relevant factors);
Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000); Armatya Sen, The
Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945-47 (2000) (discussing considerations that emphasis
on “willingness to pay” leaves out); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical: The Rationale
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729, 734-35 (criticizing discounting and use of “wage
premiums” as basis for dollar estimates of a human life’s value).
24
See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Cost of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation:
The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 48-49
(2005) (describing several positions about how to take costs and benefits into account).
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maintains that regulators should consider CBA.25 This position does not tell us how precisely
regulators should respond to CBA or what role it should play.26 At other times, however, they
advocate some sort of cost-benefit criterion, such as a requirement that the costs of a regulation
not exceed its benefits, which provides somewhat clearer guidance.27 This distinction between
the indeterminate position and support for a cost-benefit criterion will aid part IV’s analysis.
B. Origins and History
The CBA idea comes from economic theory and relies upon an analogy between
environmental protection and the purchase of goods and services.28 CBA treats government
regulation as a purchase of a benefit, rather than as an effort to protect people from harm.29 Just
as a rational consumer purchasing a good or service would not pay more than the benefit is
worth, economic theory suggests that the government should not write regulations that cause
society to incur costs that outweigh the environmental and health benefits a regulation will
bring.30 This analogy between government regulation and purchase decisions leads to a view
that government agencies should consider CBA when writing regulations.
The courts have interpreted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)31 and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)32 as requiring application of a cost-benefit

25

See Driesen, supra note 23, at 342-43 (distinguishing between the “indeterminate position” that
regulators should consider CBA and the use of a cost-benefit criterion). See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R.
Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) (CBA is a tool and a procedure not a rigid formula to determine outcomes);
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 195 (1999) (describing
CBA as a “decision procedure.”).
26
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 130 (2005) (CBA does not establish a rule governing choices).
27
See Driesen, supra note 23, at 394-402 (analyzing various cost-benefit criteria). See, e.g., Hahn &
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1498 (arguing for a presumption against regulation with costs exceeding benefits).
28
See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR
OPTIMAL POLLUTION 12 (1974) (arguing for this approach).
29
Driesen, supra note 15, at 560 (explaining why a cost-benefit criterion allows harm to continue).
30
Id. at 578 (economists assume that citizens would pay no more than a cost reflecting the value of
the effects of the prevented pollution).
31
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
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approach.33 Most other environmental, health, and safety statutes, however, employ some
combination of mandates to protect public health and safety (such as the mandate found in
section 109 of the Clean Air Act)34 and to require reductions achievable through use of
appropriate technology (i.e. technology-based standards).35 Technology-based standard setting
provisions, which are ubiquitous in environmental law, require agencies to consider cost, but do
not contemplate comparing those costs to benefits.36 As a result, regulators crafting technologybased standards may avoid quantifying benefits.
Nevertheless, a series of executive orders has often required CBA, even under statutes
that do not embrace the technique.37 President Reagan’s executive order had the explicit goal of
32

7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
pesticide registration does not obviate need for a Clean Water Act permit because FIFRA is based on CBA);
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1257? (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting TSCA to require CBA); Save
our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that pesticide registration does not eliminate
need for an environmental impact statement, because “FIFRA registration is a cost-benefit analysis”); Envtl. Def.
Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proponent of a pesticide must show that its benefits outweigh
its risks). McGarity, supra note 19, at 2343 (identifying cost-benefit balancing as the “core regulatory concept” of
TSCA and FIFRA); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 541-49 (1997) (critiquing the interpretation of TSCA as imposing a cost-benefit
test). Congress, however, amended FIFRA in 1996 to modify the cost-benefit balancing approach for pesticides
used in food. See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (codified in scattered
section of 7 U.S.C. (2000)).
Congress has also given CBA a limited role under the most recent Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA). See SDWA Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (Supp. V 1999)); McGarity, supra note 19, at 2343-44 (analyzing the cost-benefit and
risk/risk amendments); Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1393 (2002) (explaining the SDWA’s hybrid test).
34
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).
35
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§
7411(a)(1), 7412(d), 7503(a)(2), 7475(a)(4).
36
See Driesen, supra note 24, at 8-12. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act’s technology-based
“best practicable control technology” provisions do require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(1)(B) (2000). But the courts, following legislative history, have construed
this requirement as requiring marginal cost effectiveness analysis, rather than a comparison of costs to the dollar
value of environmental effects. See id. at 23-24; Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).
Cf. EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1980) (noting that BTP limitations reflect an agency
conclusion that the costs imposed on industry are worth the benefits). See also Bruce La Pierre, TechnologyForcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 819-20 (1977) (describing the one
case to deviate from Pac. Fisheries’ rejection of consideration of ecological benefits as a “major aberration.”).
37
See Exec.Order 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 app. at 431-34
(1982) (requiring that benefits outweigh costs “to the extent permitted by law.”); Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 63833
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simply reducing the burden of regulation, an objective in some tension with the aims of the
Congresses that enacted many of the modern regulatory statutes in the 1970s.38 In keeping with
the Justice Department’s view that the President could not authorize agencies to “transgress
boundaries set by Congress,” the order only applies “to the extent permitted by law.”39 The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an office consisting mostly of economists, not
lawyers,40 administers the cost-benefit executive orders and has used that authority to give CBA
much greater primacy than environmental, health, and safety statutes call for.41
Support for CBA has grown both within government and among academics. While
originally the executive orders excited a great deal of angst in Congress, in 1995 Congress
passed the Unfunded Mandates Act, which generally required its use in considering rules likely
to generate $100 million or more in costs. 42 Some judges have also expressed support for
CBA.43 And, in recent years, several very prominent academics have devoted significant
49 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1995). For more background on these orders, see Thomas O.
McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1476-79 (1996).
38
Compare E.O. 12,291, Preamble (seeking “to reduce the burdens of existing and future
regulations. . .”) with 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
39
See E.O. 12,291 §§ 2, 3(a), 6(a), 7(e); E.O. 12498 § 5; Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the
Limits of the Regulatory Review Authority of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10017, 10018 (1987). Furthermore E.O. 12,291 specifies that nothing in the order “shall be construed as
displacing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.” E.O. 12,291, §3(f)(3).
40
See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L
REV. 219, 226 (1994) (noting OMB’s lack of expertise on legal issues).
41
See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting lax agency rule passed
to satisfy OMB demands); Pub. Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing
agency action crossing out standards at the behest of OMB); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 556, 570
(D.D.C. 1986) (reversing OMB’s action in delaying rule issuance beyond a statutory deadline); Herz, supra note 40,
at 219 (“OMB . . . displaced agency decision-making . . “ regarding the content of the Clean Air Act’s operating
permit rule); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 461 (1987) (stating
that the executive orders “expressly” recognize the agency’s “ultimate” regulatory authority even if this principle is
“not followed in practice”); Oliver A Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 535, 540 (1987) (OMB has favored deregulation rather than “faithful execution of the laws”); Eric Olson, The
Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 1, 51 (1984) (explaining that OMB “goes
beyond the terms of . . . the . . . enabling statute” in exercising its review function).
42
Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000)).
43
See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1319-1321, 132627 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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amounts of their time to defending increased use of CBA in setting environmental, health, and
safety standards.44
II. Lochnerism
Scholars traditionally associate Lochnerism with the creation of substantive due process
doctrines that recognized economic rights not literally present in the Constitution.45 Viewed this
way, the Lochner period involved subjective misreading of the Constitution.46 Viewed narrowly
as only a mode of Constitutional interpretation Lochnerism has little to do with regulatory
reform. But neither the Supreme Court nor modern legal historians have viewed Lochnerism
quite this narrowly.47 They have examined the attitudes, doctrines, and approaches that lay
behind the Lochner-era Court’s decisions. The treatment below does not attempt to settle the
44

See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC POSNER, FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(forthcoming 2006); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and
Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (2004); Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the
Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 21; Hahn & Sunstein,
supra note 25, at 1489 (proposing a new executive order to make CBA more influential); Robert H. Frank & Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324 (2001) (supporting CBA even
while disapproving of a willingness-to-pay basis for estimating benefits); Matthew D. Adler, & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000) [hereinafter
Adler & Posner, Distorted Preferences]; Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory
of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (2000) [hereinafter, Adler & Posner, Welfarist Theory] (following up on
the theory set out in the 1999 article); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner eds. 2000); Adler & Posner, supra note 25 (providing a
philosophical rationale for CBA); Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1371 (1998) (addressing arguments that the inability to compare unlike things makes CBA impossible or
iuappropriate); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1995); SUnstein, supra note 41, at 462 (arguing for CBA). Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Time: A
Comment on Judge William’s Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 271 (2001) [hereinafter,
Adler, Judge Williams] (characterizing Adler’s’ support for CBA as more tentative than that of Judge Williams).
See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 26 (addressing an issue related to CBA); Matthew D. Adler, Against Individual Risk:
A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005) (same).
45
Cf. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 3 (1993) (claiming that legal scholars
generally embrace this view).
46
See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B. U. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2005) (explaining
how Lochner came to be a symbol of inappropriate judicial activism).
47
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 3-4 (1998) (describing the ideology dominating legal thought between 1886 and
1937 as a “classical outlook” addressing important jurisprudential questions); GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 10
(arguing that the Lochner period featured an effort to distinguish valid economic legislation from “invalid `class’
legislation”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Lochnerera Court used “notions of liberty and property characteristic of laissez-faire economics” as “fulcrums of judicial
review”).
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debate about how to properly interpret Lochnerism. But it does try to flesh out some of the
Lochnerism concepts relevant to contemporary regulatory reform.
A. Ideology
Justice Holmes famously chastised the Court for reading its own value choices into the
Constitution in his dissent in Lochner v. New York,48 in which the Court struck down a statute
limiting bakers’ working hours as an unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract
violative of due process.49 Holmes protested that the “Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s social statistics,”50 a reference to nineteenth century economic theory that still enjoyed
a following at the time. He accused the Court of basing its decision “upon an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain,” presumably that of laissez-faire.51 While
laissez-faire did not command universal support at the time, it enjoyed significant support among
many well educated lawyers and businessmen.52
Lochnerian ideology did not invariably lead to anti-government results. While the
Lochner-era Court struck down many statues for reasons that appear wholly indefensible to most
contemporary observers, it upheld the overwhelming majority of statutes it reviewed.53 Indeed,
just a few years before the Lochner Court had invalidated limits on bakers’ hours, the Court had

48

198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 52-53, 56-57 (majority opinion).
50
Id. at 75.
51
Id.
52
ID. at 82.
53
See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 830-32
(2005) (reviewing the success rate of governments defending both federal and state statutes from constitutional
attack); Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L.
REV. 667, 695 (1913) (finding that the Court frequently upheld state action in both the due process and commerce
clause context); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294,
294-295 (1913) (finding that the Court invalidated only 37 statutes in making 560 decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment between 1887 and 1911).
49
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upheld similar limitations on the miners’ hours in Holden v. Hardy.54 Laissez-faire ideology
strongly influenced the Court, but it did not invariably dictate anti-government results.55
B. Natural Law Origins
While contemporary laissez-faire ideology helps explain the Court’s rulings, the Court
did not see itself as ideological. Rather, it saw itself as a neutral actor advancing legal ideals
with neutral origins outside of the judges’ personal preferences.56
Some accounts of Lochnerism associate it with legal historicism, the idea that principles
not expressly found in the Constitution, such as liberty of contract, merit judicial protection as
objective natural law principles embedded in our legal tradition.57 The Lochner Court declared
that “[t]he general right to make a contract . . . is part of the liberty interest protected by the 14th
Amendment.”58 Because a maximum hours law prohibited the employer and employee from
contracting for more work hours than the statute permitted, it interfered with liberty of contract.59
The Court, drawing on common law tradition, viewed the ability to enter into contracts as an
aspect of the liberty to freely pursue a livelihood, which it considered part of the pursuit of
happiness, a right with which men are, in the Declaration’s of Independence’s words, “endowed

54

169 U.S. 366 (1897).
See WIECEK, supra note 47, at 7 (claiming that the Court was ideological, but not consistently so).
56
See ID. at 5 (linking Lochnerism’s use of abstraction with neutrality purportedly preventing a
judge’s personal sympathy from swaying him); Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878
(1987) (the due process clause commanded “neutrality” in the view of the Lochner-era Court).
57
See, e.g., JAMES HACKNEY, UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE 33 (2006) (forthcoming) (describing
Lochner as “the most infamous application of the natural law worldview”); Note, Meet Me at the (West Coast)
Hotel: The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REV. 500, 509-510 (2005) (the Adkins Court
rests its holding “on a particular philosophical anthropology of the human person and that theory’s consonant
natural rights”) (emphasis added); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the Origins
of Fundamental Rights, 92 Geo. L. J. 1, 35-39 (2003).
58
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
59
Id. at 52.
55
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by their Creator.”60 Thus, it viewed liberty of contract as having natural law origins, which it
identified with the common law.61
C. Skepticism Toward Non-Neutral Legislation
In spite of the natural, indeed divine, origins of liberty of contract, the Lochner-era Court
did not view that liberty as an absolute right. It recognized that the state may “prevent the
individual from making certain kinds of contracts,” provided that the state acted within the scope
of its “legitimate . . . police power."62 Since the Court generally found that the police power
embraced all “reasonable” regulation, judicial assessment of regulation’s reasonableness
determined the scope of legitimate police power legislation.63 The Court’s attitudes toward
legislation, then, often proved dispositive of Lochner-era cases.64
The Lochner-era Court viewed government regulation with some skepticism. Because
modern regulatory reform proponents echo Lochner-era attitudes toward regulation, an
examination of the nature of the Court’s approach to legislation will prove worthwhile.

60

See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (linking liberty of contract to the “pursuit
of happiness” right mentioned in the Declaration of Independence through the right to pursue a livelihood);
Butchers’ Union Slaughterhouse & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 761-62 (1884) (Bradley J. concurring) (linking the right to pursue a livelihood to the Declaration
of Independence’s inalienable rights clause and to British common law traditions opposing monopolies).
61
Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 489
(2005) (arguing that the Lochner Court employed “common law categories and presumptions” to “deif[y]” markets
as a “natural state of affairs”); Laurence Tribe, Clarence Thomas and “Natural Law,” N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at
A15 (stating that the Lochner Court relied upon natural law); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 1965)
(Black J. dissenting) (claiming that Lochner embodies a “natural law due process philosophy”). See Francis J.
Mootz, Law in Flux, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 11 YALE J. L. & HUMAN., 311, 334-335 (1999) (pointing out that
Aquinas treated natural as coming from God); Philip Sofer, Some Natural Confusions about Natural Law, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2393, 2405, 2397 (1991-1992) (pointing out that some natural law theories suggest that “God’s will can . . .
be the source of moral truth); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 5 (1980) (describing Lochner as a
synthesis of a “positivist science of law, natural rights constitutionalism, and Classical Economics”).
62
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
63
See OWEN M. FISS, 7 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-1910, 161-63 (1993) (Justice
Peckham’s Lochner opinion sought to preserve limits on the police power).
64
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Lochner majority’s
decision hinged upon the majority’s “convictions or prejudices.”).
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1. Class Legislation
Even before the Lochner period, the Supreme Court distinguished between “general
legislation,” which it usually upheld, and “class” or “special” legislation.65 This ideal of neutral
legislation may have performed the useful function of discouraging special interest legislation in
a society where wealth and power were not highly concentrated.66 But by the time of the
Lochner period the idea that the Constitution frowned upon class legislation was widely seen as
counterproductive, because it sometimes prevented legislatures from addressing great disparities
of power and wealth that had arisen with the growth of modern corporations.67
Professor Gillman has argued that the Lochner-era Court implicitly used this idea that
“class legislation” lacked constitutional legitimacy to strike down regulatory legislation.68 The
sense that one-sided legislation lacked legitimacy also animated decisions interpreting the antitrust laws as authorizing the use of injunctions as a weapon against organized labor.69 While
65

See, e.g., Caldwell v. Texas, 139 U.S. 137 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1891) (unanimous opinion) (laws
operating “on all alike” secure due process but “special, partial, and arbitrary” legislation offend due process); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 111, 124 (1889) (unanimous opinion) (“legislation” is not open to substantive due
process challenge if it is “general in its operation.”).
66
See generally Sunstein, supra note 56, at 878-79 (equating the Lochner-era requirement of a
public purpose for legislation with hostility to “special-interest legislation.”)
67
See J. M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 UMKC L. REV.
175, 176 n. 7 (1985-86) (pointing out that “the Court’s exaltation of liberty of contract concealed the economic
coercion” that free contracts may produce when parties have unequal bargaining power.)
68
GILLMAN, supra note 45. See also FISS, supra note 63, at 160-61 (1993) (explaining that the
Lochner Court did not regard alteration of the “distribution of power or wealth” as a legitimate end of legislation);
Balkin, supra note 67, at 182-83 (arguing that the Lochner-era Court considered redistributive law suspect). Cf.
Bernstein, supra note 57, at 12 (accusing Gillman of “greatly” exaggerating the role of class legislation concerns in
Lochner-era jurisprudence); Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV.
453, 497 (1998) (admitting that Gillman’s class legislation thesis “has some plausibility” but expressing some
doubts about it).
69
See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471 (1920) (construing section of
law limiting labor injunctions narrowly as class legislation); Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Cent. Trades Council,
257 U.S. 184, 202, 205 (1921) (picketers coercively interfere with a property right). See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Cf. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9, 16-18 (1895)
(anti-trust laws do not regulate sugar monopoly). See generally GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 1-2 (identifying
Lochnerism with the “use of the injunction against” labor); FISS, supra note 63, at 3-5 (explaining that labor
injunctions helped make the Court’s performance an issue in several Presidential elections and led to passage of
remedial legislation); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 98-127
(1991) (discussing the impact of the labor injunction upon the labor movement).
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Congress intended anti-trust statutes to limit businesses’ power,70 the background constitutional
principle that law should be general, and hence neutral, led the Court to use the anti-trust law as a
justification for enjoining labor actions71. Thus, the Lochner-era Court’s rulings suggest
suspicion of the idea that Congress might legitimately choose non-neutral policies to address
imbalances in a society where everybody is not on an equal footing. And this hostility toward
legislative value choices influenced not just the Court’s substantive due process decisions, but
contemporaneous statutory interpretation as well.
This neutrality ideal, however, went beyond the formal doctrinal distinction between
class and general legislation. That doctrinal distinction offered but one manifestation of a more
general view that law should be neutral, in the sense of not favoring one group over another.72
This view melded with a belief in the neutrality of common law and natural law.73 So, for
example, the Court favored liberty of contract in part because it perceived freedom from state
imposed regulation superseding potential contractual agreements as affecting both parties to
contracts equally.74
This belief in neutrality manifested itself in a failure to believe that law properly tipped
the scales in favor of one class or the other. In Lochner, for example, Justice Harlan’s dissent
recognized that the legislature viewed the ten hour work week as protecting bakers from being
70

See Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 468 n. 1 (setting out statutory language that appears to prohibit
anti-labor injunctions, even though the statute clearly authorizes injunctions against business combinations in
restraint of trade).
71
See id. at 471 (construing section that prohibits injunctions in employment disputes narrowly,
because it creates a “special privilege” for a “particular class.”).
72
See Cushman, supra note 11, at 886-88 (describing how contemporary scholars and case law
suggest that an ideal of neutrality and equal treatment animated interpretation of the 14th Amendment); Note, supra,
note 57, at 511 (discussing a “principle of neutrality” governing judicial intervention in police power regulation).
73
See Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of Liberty of Contract Reconsidered: Major Premises in the
Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 20, 20-21 (stating that the Court identified
objectivity with common law doctrine).
74
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52-53 (portraying the limitation of bakers’ working hours as interfering
with both the employee’s and the employer’s liberty to contract freely).
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forced to work longer hours.75 The majority, however, refused to credit the idea that employers
might enjoy stronger bargaining power than workers, treating the statute limiting baker’s hours
as perversely limiting the baker’s ability to voluntarily contract for long hours in order to provide
for his family.76 Thus, the ideal of neutral law led to an assumption that laws designed to favor
one class over another would fail to achieve their objectives of bettering the favored class’ lot.77
2. Formalism and Neutral Categories
In keeping with an ideal of law as a value-free objective enterprise, the Court used formal
neutral distinctions as a general method for decision-making, employing the sort of mechanical
formalism that the legal realists decried.78 For example, the Court distinguished activities that
directly affected commerce, which Congress could regulate, from activities that indirectly
affected Commerce, which Congress could not regulate.79 Lochner itself illustrates this use of
neutral abstract distinctions. The Court that struck down New York’s limitations on bakers’

75

See id. at 69 (arguing that the statute reflected a belief that employees were “compelled to . . .
submit” to overly long hours).
76
The statute at issue prohibited employers from requiring workers to labor for more than 10 hours
in a day. Id. at 45 n. †. Justice Peckham begins his opinion for the majority by denying that the statute prohibits
coercion. Id. at 52. He argues that the statute prohibits nothing more than a voluntary contract. Id. He portrays the
statute not as protecting the employee from being forced to labor long hours to avoid being fired, but from
interfering with an employee’s voluntary decision to work longer hours to earn more money. Id. at 52-53. Later
Justice Peckham writes that the statute “might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his
family.” Id. at 59.
77
Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1936) (recognizing that workers often do
not have sufficient bargaining power to obtain a living wage).
78
See Note, supra, note 57, at 510 (pointing out that the Court prior to the Nebbia case employed
“formal categories to distinguish . . . types of economic activity”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THEORY, 77-79 (2004) (discussing legal realist critiques of “conceptual” and “rule”
formalism); WIECEK, supra note 47, at 4-5 (describing “legal classicism” as “abstract, formal, conceptualist,
categorical, and (sometimes) deductive” and noting that this “abstraction promoted neutrality”); Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (presenting a legal realist critique of formalism). Cf.
Balkin, supra note 67, at 180-82 (discussing a similar notion of conceptualism as typifying Lochner-era
jurisprudence).
79
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-09 (1936) (striking down minimum wage and
labor regulations benefiting coal miners because such regulation only has an “indirect” effect on interstate
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605-607 (1995) (Souter J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
Lochner-era Court used the direct/indirect distinction to subject economic regulation to judicial policy judgments).
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hours in Lochner had upheld similar legislation limiting miners’ hours.80 The Court justified this
discrepancy in terms of an abstract categorical distinction between “arbitrary” regulation, which
the due process clause prohibited, and “reasonable” regulation, which the due process clause
allowed.81 It found regulation of bakers’ hours arbitrary, but similar restrictions on the miners’
hours reasonable.82
Justice Holmes’ Lochner dissent famously expressed skepticism about neutral
distinctions’ capacity to lead to neutral, or even defensible, decisions. He wrote, “General
propositions do not decide concrete cases.”83 And Holmes wrote that “Every opinion tends to
become law,”84 thereby suggesting that the Justices personal opinions, not the formal legal
categories employed, controlled the cases. Indeed, the Lochner majority opined that long
working hours for bakers posed no health hazard justifying regulation,85 whilst Justice Harlan’s
dissent expressed a willingness to credit the legislative judgment that too much baking damages
a baker’s health86. The Lochner-era Court sometimes used abstract categories to mask decisions
based on the decision-makers’ personal opinions, as both Holmes and many modern Supreme
Court Justices have pointed out.87

80

See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380, 398 (1897).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (framing the constitutional question economic
legislation raised as whether the legislation was “an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary” interference with
personal liberty or a “reasonable exercise of the police power.”) See generally Robert P. Reeder, Is Unreasonable
Legislation Unconstitutional, 62 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 191 (1914) (explaining that substantive due process cases
declare that the Court may strike down legislation it finds “unreasonable or arbitrary.”)
82
See Holden, 169 U.S. 366 (upholding a law limiting the work day of underground miners).
83
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also id. at 59 (expressing view that
baking for long hours creates no health hazard justifying regulation) (majority opinion).
84
Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
85
See id. at 59 (“We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker . . . is not an
unhealthy one . . .”).
86
See id. at 69-71 (expressing a willingness to defer to legislative judgment in light of expert support
for the proposition that baking can be hazardous).
87
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (characterizing Lochner as
imposing a “particular economic ideology on the Constitution.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995)
(Souter J. dissenting) (characterizing Lochnerism as involving “exacting scrutiny” of legislative means and ends);
81
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3. Hyper-Rationalism
This skepticism toward legislation also manifested itself in a demanding approach to the
rationales offered for government regulation.88 The Court often expected not just a plausible
justification for a regulation, but a rather compelling case, which might be very difficult to make
for any regulation involving precise line drawing.89 For example, the Lochner Court found the
argument that “ten hours” of work is healthful, but ten and a half hours is not “unreasonable and
entirely arbitrary.”90 Part three presents more examples of this hyper-rationalism in explaining
how closely it resembles modern regulatory reformers’ approach. Importantly, the Court’s
rationality concept involved a strong tendency to view “class legislation” as arbitrary.91 Hence,
hyper-rationalism derived much of its content from an ideal of value-free general legislation.
D. The Gilded Age’s Cost-Benefit State
The Court frequently employed a rough cost-benefit test to distinguish arbitrary from
reasonable government regulation.92 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,93 the second most famous

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1993) (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (describing
Lochner as a decision constitutionalizing economic ideology). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 861-62 (1992) (describing Lochner as premised false factual assumptions about the capacity of unregulated
markets to provide for minimal welfare); TXO, 509 U.S. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring) (identifying Lochner with
the creation of unenumerated rights under the 14th Amendment).
88
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying Lochnerism with “exacting judicial
scrutiny of legislative choices”); TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1346 (characterizing Lochner as exemplifying “strict and
skeptical means-ends analysis.”).
89
See TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1346-47 (noting that the Lochner Court found that long hours did harm
a baker’s health, in spite of “considerable evidence” that it did).
90
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62. The Lochner Court framed this contention in terms of whether the
bread, not the baker, becomes unhealthy when the baker works more than ten hours. See id. This framing came
from the idea that protecting the baker’s health is an illegitimate private end. See id. at 59-61 (finding that a baker’s
employment is not so unhealthy as to justifying upholding the law as a health law).
91
See Cushman, supra note 11, at 886-88 (explaining how contemporary Lochner-era scholars
equated “arbitrary” legislation with legislation favoring one group over another or redistributing resources).
92
See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 379, 393 (1988) (arguing that the Lochner period judges “wrote into the Constitution a unique American
perspective on classical economics”). The Court did, however, prohibit price regulation in industries not affected
with some substantial public interest. See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522,
535 (1923); Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1927); Hamilton,
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exemplar of Lochnerism, illustrates the Court’s embrace of CBA. The Adkins Court struck down
a statute authorizing an administrative agency to establish a minimum wage for women.94 In
explaining why the legislation was so unreasonable as to offend due process, Justice Sutherland,
writing for the Adkins majority, explained that the law requires the employer to pay the
administratively established wage “because the employee needs it, but requires no service of
equivalent value from the employee.”95 This suggests a familiar economic model. A wage
payment, like any other payment for a good or service, should secure benefits to the payer at
least equal to the cost. If the employer must pay more than the services are worth to the
employer, the costs (the wage payments) exceed the benefits (services rendered), for, as the
Court explains, the premium that the minimum wage law extracts does not generate any
corresponding extra benefit.96 Accordingly, the Adkins Court, in explaining why it found the law
arbitrary, complained that “efficiency . . . forms no part of the policy of the legislation.”97 This
case is one of numerous cases in which a cost-benefit model informed the Court’s effort to
distinguish arbitrary class legislation from reasonable permissible regulation.98

Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J. 1089 (1930); McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a
Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
93
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
94
Id. at 539, 562.
95
Id. at 557.
96
See id. at 558 (complaining that the “moral requirement implicit in every contract . . . that the
amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of just equivalence is
completely ignored.”). While the Court employed a cost- benefit model, it probably did not have a neoclassical
economic conception of marginal cost theory in mind. As Professor Hovenkamp has explained, Adkins reflects a
contemporary economic theory rejected by the neoclassical economists, called the “wage-fund doctrine.” See
Hovenkamp, supra note 92, at 431-37. Under this doctrine forced transfers between capitalists and labor would
produce disasters for the laborer. Id. at 433. This idea found expression in the Adkins opinion. See id. at 437 (citing
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557). This discrepancy between neoclassical economics and the particulars of Lochnerism
hardly harms the analogy between Lochnerism and regulatory reform, because the details of marginal cost theory
have not figured prominently in regulatory reformers’ case for CBA.
97
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557.
98
See Cushman, supra note 11, at 885-88, 896 (defining class legislation as that which arbitrarily
transfers property “from A to B” and showing how Adkins’ CBA led to the conclusion that the minimum wage
statute was class legislation in this sense).
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Rough CBA also played a prominent role in the era’s cases addressing regulation of
prices charged by public utilities, railroads, and similar entities.99 In Smyth v. Ames, a leading
rate regulation case of the period, the Court held that states may not establish railroad rates
below the level needed to justly compensate the railroad for providing service to the public.100
Again, this reflects a cost-benefit model, suggesting that a carrier should receive payments
roughly commensurate with the cost of providing its service. While the Court failed to agree
upon a precise methodology to calculate the required “just” rate of return on investment, this
concept dominated subsequent rate-making cases.101 And this cost-benefit test led the Court to
strike down rate regulations in some thirty-nine cases between 1897 and 1937.102
A cost-benefit framework also played a role in decisions upholding rate regulations. For
example, in Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United States, the Court upheld a statute
confiscating “excess” profits from heavily traveled railroad lines to subsidize service on less
traveled routes.103 Rents in excess of the benefits conferred conflict with economic models,
which define efficiency in terms of arrangements equating benefits and costs.104 Even though
the statute forced, in effect, a transfer payment “from A to B,” the Court unanimously upheld it,
99

See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 92, at 440 (the Supreme Court of the Lochner period
permitted “state intervention only where the classical economists . . . would have permitted it.”)
100
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898) (requiring states to establish rates that will “admit of
the carrier earning such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to the public.”). See Cushman,
supra note 11, at 909 (describing Smith v. Ames as the culmination of a line of rate making cases). See also Reagan
v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 410 (1894) (suggesting that just as equal protection of the laws forbids
compelling “one class . . . to suffer loss that others may gain,” justice forbids “use for the public benefit at less than
its market value”)
101
See, e.g., Miss. R.R. Comm’n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917) (describing rates
that prevent “a fair return upon the property invested” as “arbitrary” and therefore void as repugnant to due process).
102
Phillips, supra note 68, at 498.
103
263 U.S. 456, 476, 485 (1924) (showing that Congress provided for the distribution of excessive
profits and upholding the law on that basis).
104
See I HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES, at 253-54 (2003) (defining the “social optimum” regulation or tax as one that equates
marginal abatement cost to marginal damage); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 715, 725 (1996) (assuming that a rule where costs equals benefits
is ideal); JOHN GOWDY & SABINE O'HARA, ECONOMIC THEORY FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS 16 (1995).
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because it did not impose costs exceeding benefits. As Justice Taft explained, the Constitution
does not guarantee “more than a fair net operating income,” so the owner “can not expect . . .
high . . . returns.”105
In many cases outside the rate-making context as well, a CBA-like model proved
influential.106 Hence, a CBA-like model played a leading role in a significant portion of the
Court’s economic due process cases.
E. Repudiation of Lochnerism
The Supreme Court eventually rejected searching judicial review of economic
legislation’s reasonableness.107 In doing so, it expressly recognized the necessity and legitimacy
of legislative value choice.108
The acceptance of legislative value choices led not only to the abandonment of
substantive due process review of economic regulation, but also to the practice of generally

105

Id. at 481.
See, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 349 (1935) (invalidating requirement that
railroad reemploying a worker who left a railroad’s service before the statute’s enactment to include that service in
pension calculations, because that premium pays “for services fully compensated” under the previous contract for
service); Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 97, 100 (1931) (invaliding exemption of “short line” railroads
from obligation to pay fees for use of other lines’ cars, because mandating free use of property is “arbitrary and
unreasonable.”); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920) (invalidating an order
requiring owner of a narrow gauge railroad to operate at a loss); Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 239 U.S. 478,
485 (1916) (prohibiting a drainage district from taxing a property that would receive no benefits corresponding to
the tax); Chicago, Rock Island, & Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 499 (1915)
(invalidating a statute prohibiting lowering of an unoccupied upper berth in a sleeping car where a passenger has
occupied a lower berth because this prohibition takes “salable space without pay.”); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S.
R.R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 358-59 (1912) (invalidating requirement that railroad pay claims for injured
livestock within thirty days of demand to avoid double damages and a fee award when it creates “extraordinary
liability” for “refusing to pay” an “excessive demand,” i.e. one exceeding the value of the livestock) [emphasis
added].
107
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729
(1963) (repudiating unreasonableness test for substantive due process, because it leads judges to “strike down laws”
thought “unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy.”). Cf. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J. dissenting) (warning of the danger of enacting judicial “prejudices
into legal principles” through review of social and economic legislation under the “arbitrary” and “capricious”
standard of substantive due process).
108
Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 726 (“legislatures . . must decide upon the wisdom and utility of
legislation”).
106
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accepting legislative line drawing under the equal protection clause (at least where no suspect
classification is involved).109 The modern Court’s substantive due process and equal protection
cases specifically repudiate the tradition of viewing “class” legislation as suspect.110 The modern
doctrine requires the Court to uphold any legislative distinctions (between classes or otherwise)
unless the distinctions drawn wholly lack a “rational basis”.111 The Court’s decisions recognize
that its prior approach to judicial review had led to the creation of legal principles based on
judges’ economic and social views, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the use of neutral
categories.112 The Court also recognized, at about the same time that it repudiated its Lochnerera constitutional jurisprudence, that Congress considered the Court’s neutralist anti-trust
jurisprudence a similar abuse of power and abandoned the use of the labor injunction under antitrust statutes.113 Finally, in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,114 the Court repudiated the
natural law tradition that partially underlay legal historicism.115
III. Parallels with Regulatory Reform

109

See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause only prevents
invidious discrimination); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (same). See generally Cushman, supra note 11, at 888-95
(explaining that during the Lochner period the Court often did not sharply distinguish Due Process from Equal
Protection).
110
See West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937) (approving of the Adkins dissent’s view
that the legislature may properly sustain a minimum wage because it benefits “employees” as a class). The Parish
Court also recognized the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. Id. at 393-94, 398-99.
It accordingly overruled a leading Lochner-era case, Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, in Parish. Id. at 400.
111
See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (legislation will be upheld unless it
precludes the “assumption that it rests upon a rational basis”); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491 (upholding regulation
because the regulation has a rational relation to an objective); Adler, supra note 12, at 118-119 (both the equal
protection clause and the due process clause require a minimal rational relationship between a law and a legitimate
government purpose).
112
See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729-30; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (stating that “the day is gone

when this Court uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws . . . because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”)
113

See Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., 311 U.S. 91, 102-03
(1940) (discussing Congressional findings of “abuses of judicial power” and misinterpretation of anti-trust law)
114
304 U.S. 64 (1938)
115
See id. at 79 (rejecting the existence of a “transcendental body of law”).
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As suggested previously, contemporary regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward legislation
resemble those of the Lochner Court. Before developing this parallel, it will prove helpful to
review the role of economic ideology and judicial activism in regulatory reform.116 While in this
realm contemporary regulatory reform does not perfectly resemble Lochnerism, judicial activism
and economic ideology have played important roles in regulatory reform, just as they did in
advancing laissez-faire capitalism in the Lochner period.
A. Judicial Activism
The modern Court’s rejection of substantive due process review of economic regulation
has made that weapon off limits to regulatory reformers challenging regulatory statutes. We
have already seen that the Court rejected an effort to revive the nondelegation doctrine as a check
on regulatory legislation in American Trucking. Indeed, Constitutional law generally plays a
much lesser role in contemporary regulatory reform than it did in the Lochnerian attack on
regulation. The executive orders requiring CBA have certainly been more important to
regulatory reform than constitutional law.
Yet, the Court has employed substantive due process to carry out tort reform, which
conservative think tanks and business groups, the leading drivers of regulatory reform, support
along with CBA.117 The Court has prohibited “grossly excessive” punitive damage awards as a
matter of substantive due process.118 The Court employs a rough cost-benefit test, an evaluation
of the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted upon the plaintiff, as a significant
116

See generally Shaman, supra note 61, at 490 (noting that some insist that the main problem with
the Lochner Court was excessive activism).
117
See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 561 n. * (1996) (listing business groups and
Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank, as supporting constitutional limits on punitive damage
awards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 445 n. * (1993) (same); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n. 4 (1990) (listing business groups appearing as amici seeking substantive due process limits
on punitive damage awards). See generally, Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1093 (2005).
118
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
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element of its approach to determining excessiveness.119 In developing this test for judicial tort
reform the Court relied upon several Lochner-era precedents.120 In the debate about what test to
apply to damage awards, Justice O’Connor noted the relationship between regulatory reform and
Lochnerism. She opined that “[J]ust as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statistics, it does not require us to adopt the views of the Law and Economics
school either.”121 Yet, when the Court for the first time in its history actually struck down a
damages award under the Lochner-era substantive due process excessiveness test, Justice
Breyer’s concurrence faulted the Alabama Supreme Court for failing to apply “any economic
theory” to support its punitive damages award.122 Justice O’Connor signed on to the Breyer
concurrence, apparently because it distinguishes judicial insistence that the Constitution
embodies “some economic theory” from judicial insistence that the Constitution embodies a
particular economic theory.123 This concurring view would, in essence, constitutionalize a
central tenant of the regulatory reform movement, which generally employs an approach to
regulation predicated upon economic concepts without any evident agreement about details.124
Justices Scalia and Thomas have rejected the excessiveness inquiry precisely because it reflects
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BMW, 517 U.S. at 580 (citing this factor as “perhaps the most commonly cited indicium (sic) of . .
. excessive punitive damages”)
120
See TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
substantive limit upon penalties) (citing Seaboard Air Lines R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907); St. Louis,
I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1919); and Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286
(1912)); Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (citing TXO to support the notion of substantive due process imposing a limit on
punitive damage awards). See also BMW, 517 U.S. at 600-01 (discussing the Court’s reliance on Lochner-era
precedents). A majority in TXO defended reliance on these Lochner-era precedents on the grounds that the Lochner
dissenters joined the opinions relied upon. TXO, 509 U.S. at 455 (plurality opinion for three Justices), 479-80
(dissenting opinion for three Justices) (agreeing with the plurality’s adherence to these precedents).
121
TXO, 509 U.S. at 491 (Justice O’Connor, dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)),
122
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123
See id. (drawing this distinction).
124
See generally, Sen, supra note 22, at 932-33 (noting that proponents of CBA do not agree about
what precisely it means).
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the Lochnerian error of finding unenumerated substantive rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment.125
These cases do not reflect Lochnerian attitudes toward legislation, for they are not
directed toward legislation. Rather, they reflect skepticism toward juries.126 Furthermore, this
use of Lochnerism in the service of tort reform has proven somewhat limited so far. The Court
has only issued two opinions invalidating punitive damages awards to date, but it has also
vacated several other jury awards in light of these decisions.127
Judicially created doctrines of standing and broad sovereign immunity sometimes impede
environmental laws’ enforcement.128 These doctrines reflect the Court’s continuing tendency to
treat common law baselines as somehow natural and to read them into the Constitution.129 Thus,

125

TXO, 509 U.S. at 470-71 (Scalia, J. concurring) (declining to find a “secret repository of . . .
unenumerated substantive rights” in the Due Process Clause and finding it “particularly difficult to imagine” that the
Clause authorizes judicial limits on punitive damages). See also BMW, 517 U.S. at 599-602 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the Lochner-era cases upon which the Court relies “simply fabricated the due process right at issue”
in dicta).
126
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003) (expressing
concerns about jury verdicts reflecting prejudice, bias or whims); TXO, 509 U.S. at 464 (plurality opinion) (juries
hearing about the wealth of a wrongdoer may act based on “prejudice against large corporations”); 467 (Kennedy J.
concurring) (suggesting that substantive due process review of jury verdicts should guard against punitive damage
awards reflecting jury “bias, passion, or prejudice”); 474 (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (claiming that “arbitrariness,
caprice, passion, bias, and even malice” infects jurors more often than judges); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (juries inflict “multimillion dollar losses” upon defendants “on a
whim”).
127

See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (finding punitive damages award unreasonable); BMW, 517 U.S. at
585-86 (finding a punitive damage award “grossly excessive”); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive
Damages Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1365 (2005) (stating that the Court vacated damage awards against
five defendants after Campbell).
128
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64, 579 (1992) (plurality and
concurring opinions) (requiring plaintiffs to purchase tickets to visit places whence an endangered species might
vanish to establish standing to challenge failure of government to apply the Endangered Species Act to federally
funded projects overseas); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972) (requiring the Sierra Club to obtain
an affidavit from one of its members who uses the Mineral King Valley before permitting suit aimed at blocking a
ski resort there); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2nd Cir. 1999) (dismissing, on sovereign immunity grounds,
a citizen suit against a state under several environmental statutes).
129
See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 878-79 (explaining that the Court tended to view departures from
common law baselines defining neutrality as class legislation serving special interests). See also Albert C. Lin,
Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 605-
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for example, while Article III’s literal language authorizing adjudication of not only cases, but
also “controversies” seems to allow anybody who disagrees with an administrative decision to
challenge it,130 the Court has required a showing of injury that reflects a common law model of a
lawsuit.131 Similarly, the Court has stretched sovereign immunity’s scope far beyond what the
11th Amendment’s text authorizes, relying on the proposition that the framers intended to
preserve common law sovereign immunity.132 But still, these doctrines have not materially
advanced regulatory reform; they have merely complicated enforcement of some law at times.133

619 (2005) (explaining how the Court has used common law causation concepts to narrow the scope of
environmental statutes).
130
See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding a Concrete Context for
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 877 (2004) (claiming that standing has no textual basis in Article
III); Robert J. Pushaw, Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Function of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 480-82, 526-27 (1994) (arguing that cases do not necessarily involve controversies
between adverse parties); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (suggesting that the literal
language of Article III cannot justify standing doctrine by pointing out that an “executive inquiry” can be called a
“case” and that a “legislative dispute” can be called a “controversy”). See also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L. J. 816, 840 (1969) (calling the idea that the
Constitution requires injury “historically unfounded”).
131
See Driesen, supra note 130, at 835-36 (describing a private law model that undergirds the Court’s
standing jurisprudence); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 893-94 (explaining how modern standing doctrine incorporates
common law understandings). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (describing a private law model of adjudication as dispute resolution).
132
See Driesen, supra note 130, at 832 (describing the difference between the Court’s version of
sovereign immunity and the immunity explicitly set out in the 11th Amendment); Bd. Of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (acknowledging that the Court has extended state immunity to suits from their
own citizens even though “by its terms” the 11th Amendment only applies to suits by citizens from another State);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (affirming that the Eleventh Amendment “stands not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms”) (citation omitted); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 715-16 (1999) (invoking common law sovereign immunity to justify prohibiting Maine governmental
employees from suing their state government for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 700 (1999) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that sovereign
immunity is a common law doctrine); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(discussing sovereign immunity’s common law origins). Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004)
(holding that Congress had constitutionally abrogated sovereign immunity under the 14th Amendment in Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003) (upholding
a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow for private enforcement of The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (majority opinion) (suggesting that sovereign immunity was not only a product of
English common law, but part of the “fundamental jurisprudence in all civilized nations”) [citation and internal
quotation omitted]. See generally Symposium: State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000);
Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1, 913 (1988) (exploring the 11th Amendment and its interpretation prior to the recent change in jurisprudence).
133
See generally, Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 701-704 (charging that sovereign immunity, like
Lochner, threatens to “deprive Congress of necessary legislative flexibility,” in part by limiting its ability to rely on
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Increased judicial willingness to limit Congressional power over Commerce could
threaten environmental law.134 Judicial limits on federal regulatory power can aid the agenda of
some regulatory reformers who seek to transfer power over environmental matters from the
federal government to the states.135 The dissenters in United States v. Lopez136 and United States
v. Morrison137 complained that the Court has embraced a formalist distinction, between
commercial and non-commercial activities, reminiscent of the Lochner-era’s mechanical
jurisprudence, and as incapable of producing principled results as the old direct/indirect affects
distinction.138 But these decisions are not divorced from Constitutional text as the old
substantive due process jurisprudence was.139 The Constitution clearly does contemplate a

“a decentralized system of individual private remedies”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 655-660 (1999) (explaining why immunizing states from private suits for patent
infringement may leave patent holders with inadequate remedies)..
134
See generally Branford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA.
L. REV. 723, 723-24 (2002) (“a broad reading of Lopez and Morrison might call into question . . . some
environmental statutes or regulations”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting a prohibition on gun possession in school zones).
135
See William F. Pedersen, Contracting with the Regulated for Better Reglation, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
1067, 1074 (2001) (identifying “a regulatory reform contract approach” with “devolution” of responsibility to the
states and to regulated entities); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1495, 1496 (1999) (explaining that much of the regulatory reform debate focuses on the question of what level of
government should have authority to address environmental problems); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental
Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1996)
(identifying devolution of authority to state and local government as a central tenet of conservative reform efforts);
McGarity, supra note 37, at 1497, 1506, 1511 (explaining that most schools of regulatory reform favor
decentralized decision-making); NEWT GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995) (arguing for devolution of power to
state and local governments). See also Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (1997) (analyzing the Unfunded Mandates concept, which played a key role in the
Unfunded Mandates Act, a reform bill advancing both CBA and devolution).
136
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
137
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
138
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606-608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (analogizing the direct/indirect distinction to
the majority’s commercial/non-commercial distinction), at 628-630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
commercial/non-commercial distinction is extremely malleable); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640-43 (arguing that the
commercial/non-commercial distinction is unworkable and ignores the “painful” history of the Lochner period). See
also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211, 2244 (2005) (disagreement between the majority and dissent about
the definition of commercial activity).
139
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 594 n. 9 (claiming that Lopez, unlike Lochner, “enforces . . . the Constitution,
not judicial policy judgments).
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federal government of limited power.140 The majority in these cases may have understood that it
was risking a return to Lochnerian vices by using formalist distinctions, but found the alternative
of foregoing judicial enforcement of some constraint on the Commerce Clause authority
unacceptable.141 So far, these decisions have not led courts to declare any environmental law
unconstitutional.142 But the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in three cases that offer it
an opportunity to use its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to restrict federal regulation protecting
wetlands.143
The more important realm for judicial activism in the service of regulatory reform has
involved statutory interpretation, not constitutional law.144 Thus, statutory cases like Duplex
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See U.S. Const., Art. I; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (identifying the idea that the Constitution creates a
Federal Government with a few enumerated powers as a first principle); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J.
dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the Constitution withholds some powers from Congress); H. Jefferson
Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654-55 (1995) (noting that the majority
assertion that the federal government’s power is limited is unsurprising and provokes no challenge from the
dissenting Justices).
141
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (stating that the commercial/non-commercial distinction may create
some “legal uncertainty,” but that the Constitution requires the Court to police the outer bounds of enumerated
Congressional power).
142
See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge
to the Clean Water Act); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding the Endangered
Species Act); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483
(4th Cir. 2000) (same); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); United
States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause Challenge to work practice standards for
asbestos under the Clean Air Act); Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to the Clean Air Act). Cf. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-68 (2001) (interpreting federal jurisdiction over wetlands narrowly
while articulating federalism concerns); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (same). For an
especially perceptive analysis of issues affecting the constitutionality of environmental laws under the Lopez, see
John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174
(1998).
143
See Summary of Orders, 74 U.S.L.W. 3219, 3219-20 (Oct. 11, 2005).
144
Judicial activism is difficult to define. See Robert E. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial
Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 347 (1989)
(pointing out that application of the term “judicial activism” is often unclear). A working definition of statutory
judicial activism would consider a decision activist when conventional techniques of statutory interpretation do not
provide at least a reasonably good justification for the result and judicial views about appropriate policy seem to
play a large role.
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Printing Press Co. v. Deering145 and American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Cent. Trades
Council,146 furnish the most salient Lochnerian analogue to contemporary judicial activism, not
Lochner itself. These cases authorized injunctions of a labor-related boycott of a printing press
and of a picket in support of striking workers at a steel foundry in the teeth of a statutory
provision forbidding the use of injunctions in labor disputes.147 They share with Lochner not
only a disregard for textual limits, but also solicitude toward common law rights and opposition
to “class” legislation.148
Cass Sunstein, a prolific CBA supporter, has argued for a cost-benefit canon of
construction.149 Such a canon would authorize the judiciary to interpret ambiguous statutory
language to require CBA. In effect, he urges judges who agree with his policy views to make the
judges’ policy preferences determinative in many cases. This approach emulates, to some
degree, the Lochner-era vice of allowing prevailing economic ideologies to influence judicial
law-making, a vice evidenced by the Court’s strained interpretation of the anti-trust laws. But, as
we have seen, the Supreme Court rejected industry requests for such a canon in the American
Trucking case.150 This suggests that the modern Supreme Court, at least, has not gone as far as
the Lochner Court in “erecting its prejudices into law.”
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254 U.S. 443, 471 (1920) (construing section of law limiting labor injunctions narrowly to allow
judiciary to enjoin a labor action).
146
257 U.S. 184, 202, 205 (1921) (enjoining picketers under an anti-trust law).
147
See Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 468 n. 1; Am. Foundries, 257 U.S. at 201-202.
148
The Duplex Printing Court construed the prohibition on labor injunctions of the Clayton Act
narrowly because it restricted the “general” operation of anti-trust laws by granting a “special privilege to a
particular class.” 254 U.S. at 271. Both cases also treat labor actions as coercive interference with a property right.
See id. at 465-66, 478-79 (boycott coercively interferes with a property right); Am. Foundries, 257 U.S. at 202, 205
(picketers coercively interfere with a property right).
149
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 487
(1987) (suggesting that courts should presumptively read statutes to require that regulations benefits be at least
“roughly commensurate with their costs”).
150
Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring consideration of cost
when the statute does not clearly preclude it); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-24 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (requiring EPA to consider a proposed rule’s effect on gasoline price and supply under a statutory provision
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Still, judicial support for regulatory reform has played a role in several important
cases.151 The dissenting Justices in the Benzene case, Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute,152 associated judicial support for regulatory reform with Lochnerism.153 The
dissenters claimed that the Benzene Court struck “its own balance between the costs and benefits
of occupational safety standards.”154 They suggested that the majority had misread the statute to
implement its own views of proper risk management, just as the Lochner Court had misread the
Constitution in order to implement its own economic philosophy.155 The plurality opinion
required a finding of significant risk before regulation of toxic substances could occur under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.156 This requirement flowed in part from sympathy toward a
cost-benefit framework, for the plurality did not want to “give OSHA the power to impose

not mentioning costs); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (authorizing
the Federal Aviation Administration to consider costs to the air tourism industry in deciding how to devise a plan for
“substantial restoration of natural quiet” in the Grand Canyon area).
151
See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 144, at 421 (concluding that “the Supreme Court has elevated
economic efficiency to a level of importance not shared by Congress.”). I am here defining regulatory reform
primarily in terms of a concern with CBA. Other writers have addressed the environmental tendencies of the Court
more broadly. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 129, at 565 (arguing that the Court’s October 2003 term continued a trend
of gradually eroding environmental law through the use of common law causation analysis, textualism, and
federalism); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court,
47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 708-736 (1999) (reviewing the voting records of individual Justices in environmental cases);
Daniel A. Farber, Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 547 (1997)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has had little impact upon environmental law); Levy & Glicksman, supra note 144,
at 346 (claiming that “the Supreme Court has pursued a policy far less protective of the environment than the Policy
intended by Congress”) . While none of these general articles ascribe Lochnerian tendencies to the Court as a
whole, some of them mention tendencies of individual Justices that seem distinctly Lochnerian. See Lazarus, supra,
at 727 (stating that Justice Scalia seems concerned that environmental law “may promote governmental authority at
the expense of individual autonomy, such as in the exercise of property rights.”)
152
448 U.S. 607 (1980)
153
Id. at 723-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Id. In context the dissenter’s reference to the majority’s “own balance,” stands in contrast to the
balance struck by Congress. See id. at 713 (claiming that the plurality “is more interested in the consequences of its
decision than in discerning” Congressional intent). And the dissenters analogize the Court’s willingness to enact its
own views into law in “Benzene” to the Lochner majority’s use of laissez-faire philosophy. See id. at 723-24 (citing
Holme’s suggestion that the Lochner majority made Herbert Spencer’s Social Statistics into a governing legal
principle).
156
Id. at 639-40 (finding that section 3(8) requires the Secretary to determine that a standard it issues
is reasonable necessary to remedy “a significant risk of material health impairment).
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enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”157 Only Justice Powell,
however, read the Occupational Safety and Health Act as requiring CBA.158 And the Supreme
Court squarely rejected that view in the subsequent Cotton Dust case.159 The Benzene decision,
however, pushed government agencies toward greater reliance on quantitative risk assessment,
which, as we have seen, serves as a critical element of CBA.160 Professor McGarity has
explained that this decision had an enormous influence on government regulation of carcinogens,
discouraging generic cancer policy and significantly reducing the protectiveness of regulation.161
The Court thus substantially advanced regulatory reform, and it did so with very little statutory
support.162

157

Id. at 645.
Id. at 776 (Powell, J. concurring) (concluding that the statute requires a “reasonable relationship”
between the costs and benefits of regulation). The dissenters apparently intended their accusation of Lochnerism to
apply to Justice Powell, for they accused the “Court” of Lochnerism, see id. at 723-24 (dissenting opinion), not just
the plurality, cf. 708-13 (addressing itself to the “plurality”) (dissenting opinion).
159
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 507-523 (1981) (rejecting argument that costs
of implementing OSHA toxic standards must bear a reasonable relationship to benefits).
160
See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 652-58 (putting a burden of proof upon the agency that would be
difficult or impossible to meet without quantifying risk). While the opinion is unclear about whether it in fact
requires quantitative risk assessment, see id. at 654-55 (disclaiming any intent to impose a “mathematical
straightjacket” while relying exclusively on examples of how to meet the Court’s requirements of demonstrating
significant risk that quantified the probability of harm), the federal agencies have found it difficult to satisfy the
opinion’s strictures without it. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Story of the Benzene Case: Judicially Imposed
Regulatory Reform through Risk Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 165-68 (Richard J. Lazarus and
Oliver A. Houck eds. 2005) (explaining how the Court’s decision helped destroyed generic cancer policy and led to
reliance on case-by-case quantitative risk assessment). Cf. Farber, supra note 151, at 552-53 (stating that the Court
did not offer “clear leadership” on the issue of whether regulation is warranted based on unquantifiable evidence).
161
McGarity, supra note 160, at 165-66.
162
Accord Sunstein, supra note 14, at 360 n. 266 (noting that “no statutory source” supported the
Benzene plurality’s significant risk requirement); Farber, supra note 151, at 553 n. 27 (noting that “the plurality
opinion is quite difficult to square” with the statute’s “plain language”); Levy and Glicksman, supra note 144, at 380
(finding “the plurality efforts to explain the result in terms of statutory language and legislative history largely
unpersuasive.”): Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks, Environmental Values, Institutional Responsibility, and
the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1983) (finding the plurality’s position “implausible on its
face.”). Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) requires standards that assure “to the
extent feasible, that no employee . . . suffer material” health impairment. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 612 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)(2000)).
158
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The Court also advanced regulatory reform substantially in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,163 when it upheld an expansion of EPA’s “bubble” policy allowing polluters to
trade emissions between sources with a facility. But this case involved a very close call from the
standpoint of statutory construction, and offers even less support than Benzene for a charge of
Lochnerian activism.164
Lower court judges, however, have sometimes actively advocated regulatory reform. For
example, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,165 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit interpreted section six of the Toxic Substances Control Act166 (TSCA) as requiring CBA
of each regulatory alternative considered.167 Section six requires EPA to regulate “to the extent
necessary to protect adequately against . . . risk using the least burdensome requirements.”168
Once EPA has decided to regulate under this section, it must “adequately” protect the public
against the risks involved. If several possible requirements adequately protect against the risk, it
163

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The Court has also supported “market-based” approaches to regulatory reform through its dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence. In a line of cases beginning with Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978),
the Court has favored interstate markets in waste disposal services over local governmental control of garbage
disposal. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court struck down a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of
waste from other states. Id. at 618, 628-29. The Court rejected the argument that the claimed statutory purpose, to
conserve local landfill space in order to adequately protect the state’s environment, justified the ban. Id. at 625-27.
In so doing, it chose not to rely upon precedent allowing states to ban imports of other materials presenting health
hazards. See id. 631-33 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (claiming that the majority had not adequately distinguished this
precedent). In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court also held that the dormant commerce clause prohibited
enactment of “flow control” ordinances and fees, which local governments use to try and establish local control of
garbage disposal. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating ordinance
requiring delivery of local garbage to a local transfer station); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of the
State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating statute charging a larger tipping fee for waste brought from out-ofstate than is charged for waste generated within Oregon); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334
(1992) (invalidating a surcharge on hazardous waste generated outside of Alabama). See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidating ordinance allowing counties to
refuse waste from outside of county).
These cases do not appear especially activist in a Lochnerian sense, because the tradition of striking down
discriminatory regulation has such a long lineage. They do reflect, however, the exercise of discretion in
determining the limits of the anti-discrimination principle in a way that favors regulatory reform.
165
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
166
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
167
See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217.
168
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).
164
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must choose the least burdensome requirement. It must also consider the economic
consequences of any rule it promulgates.169 The requirement to choose the least burdensome
measure adequately protecting the public implies that EPA must compare the costs of adequately
protective regulatory options to each other. Nothing in the statute, however, states that EPA
must compare a single regulatory option’s costs to its benefits. Indeed, in a case where only one
regulatory option protected the public adequately, section six plainly would require adoption of
that option, even if the costs far exceeded the benefits.170 For section six explicitly requires
adoption of an option that adequately protects the public. Yet, the Proof Fittings court required
CBA of each option.
Even this decision, while certainly congruent with contemporary economic ideology and
perhaps with active enactment of the judges’ views into law, may simply reflect poor
interpretation of a complex statute. Congress had declared in section two of TSCA that it
intended that EPA “shall consider the . . . economic . . . impact of any action” that it “takes or
proposes . . .”171 While even this section does not require comparison of costs to benefits or
consideration of the costs of alternatives that do not adequately protect health, one can charitably
interpret the decision as simply failing to adequately harmonize section two with the operative
language in section six. Even so, it’s hard to believe that the contemporary intellectual climate
did not make the wooden cost-benefit interpretation chosen appear natural to the court, in spite of
its incongruity with the specifics of the statute. The court could easily have harmonized section
two with section six by requiring cost effectiveness comparisons between adequate regulatory
alternatives, without requiring any quantification of benefits.
169

15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2000).
Furthermore, in comparing two adequate regulatory options, the statutory language rather plainly
requires EPA to choose the least burdensome, even if the least burdensome option has the worst cost-benefit ratio.
171
15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (2000).
170
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This decision had an enormous impact upon EPA’s regulation of toxic substances.
Indeed, after this ruling EPA never again proposed to ban or seriously regulate any substance
under TSCA section six, apparently because quantification of benefits proved so daunting.
Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have
been more overtly ideological and willing to use the Constitution to advance their ideology.172
But the decisions evincing this ideology most clearly have not had as large an impact as
Lochner-era labor injunction cases or Corrosion Proof Fittings. For example, in the
Lockout/Tagout opinion, International Union v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)173, the D.C. Circuit held that OSHA must narrowly construe statutory provisions
governing non-toxic workplace hazards to avoid a nondelegation difficulty.174 The court went on
to offer a paean to CBA and to urge the agency to cure the statutory ambiguity leading to
nondelegation concerns by adopting CBA.175 Still, the court did not require CBA176 and
approved an agency interpretation that did not rely upon CBA in a subsequent decision.177
The most far reaching attempt to use the Constitution as a regulatory reform engine came
in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, when the District of Columbia Circuit held that Clean Air
Act section 109’s health protection requirement ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.178 But,
as we have seen, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed this decision.
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See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding that ideology significantly influences this court’s decision-making).
173
938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The case is known as Lockout/Tagout, because it addressed a
rule requiring employers to tag or lockout (i.e. temporarily disable) devices capable of injuring workers. Id. at 1312
174
Id. at 1316, 1321.
175
Id. at 1319-1321 (majority opinion), 1326-27 (Williams, J., concurring).
176
Id. at 1321 (we hold only that CBA is a permissible interpretation of § 3(8)) [emphasis in the
original].
177
United Auto Workers v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that the agency’s
construction satisfied the nondelegation doctrine notwithstanding its rejection of CBA).
178
175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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The cases examined here suggest that judicial activism on behalf of contemporary regulatory
reform has greatly influenced the law (Benzene and Corrosion Proof Fittings alone justify that
conclusion), but has proven less prevalent and gross than Lochner-era judicial activism aimed at
labor.179
B. Ideology and Natural Law Origins
Both CBA and the Lochner-era embrace of liberty of contract share a common natural
law origin.180 The CBA idea stems from neoclassical elaboration of efficiency ideals derived
from the work of Adam Smith, who posited a law of nature by which an “invisible hand” made
the market work to the benefit of all.181 This same natural law of the invisible hand also
supported decentralization of economic power through liberty of contract.182 Smith himself
referred to the “right of trafficking” as a “natural” right.183 Thus, liberty of contract and CBA

179

See generally Phillips, supra note 68, at 491 (noting that “most critics of Lochner era substantive
due process agree that the doctrine assisted business while disadvantaging workers.”).
180
See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98
HARV. L. REV. 592, 597(1985) (CBA’s “intellectual and social heritage . . lies in the classical eighteenth and
nineteenth century economics of unfettered contracts . . . .”).
181
SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 129 (CBA is often justified on grounds of economic efficiency);
LEONIDAS MONTES, ADAM SMITH IN CONTEXT: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF SOME CENTRAL COMPONENTS OF
HIS THOUGHT 142-47 (2004) (discussing how Newton inspired social scientists like Smith to search for “first
principles” governing human conduct); . Professor Montes argues that Smith has “too readily been assimilated to
the natural jurisprudential tradition,” because this view neglects the “humanist” aspects of Smith’s work. MONTES,
supra, at 147. Assuming that Professor Montes is correct, this neglect of Smith’s humanism does not negate the
point made here. The neoclassical economic tradition emphasizes the mechanistic elements of Smith’s work,
especially the Invisible Hand metaphor. ID. at 130. Recognizing that this emphasis distorts Smith’s thought does
not negate the origins of neoclassical theory in Smith’s law of the Invisible Hand. See ID. at 150-52, 160
(acknowledging this influence).
182
See Balkin, supra note 67, at 179; WIECEK, supra note 47, at 82 (the elite bar of the Lochner age
derived from Adam Smith an idea that the market “set the natural and just price for capital and labor”); Fiss, supra
note 63, at 47 (Graham Sumner, an influential American proponent of social Darwinism, drew upon the work of
Herbert Spencer and Adam Smith); Hovenkamp, supra note 92 at 402-407 (tracing Lochnerian views about property
and contract back to Adam Smith).
183
ADAM SMITH LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 8 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein eds.
1978). Smith also posited that the right to adjudication of a breach of contract arose from a natural law of human
behavior, namely, that a promise “naturally creates an expectation” that the promise will be fulfilled. ID. at 12.
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come from a natural law tradition, in the sense of a law having a basis in fundamental
understandings of human nature.184
To be sure, neither the Lochner Court nor many contemporary regulatory reformers
directly acknowledge natural law’s influence upon their views.185 But the Lochner Court’s
discussion of bakers pursuing happiness through voluntary contracts to work long hours certainly
echoes Smith’s description of people bettering society through specialized labor and voluntarily
exchange.186 Similarly, CBA owes its origins to neoclassical refinement of some of Smith’s
ideas. An analogy between free contracts and environmental regulation justifies CBA. CBA
reflects a belief that government officials enacting regulation purchase environmental benefits on
behalf of the public, much as a buyer purchases goods through a contract or other exchange.187
The need to quantify benefits and compare them to costs flows directly from this vision of
environmental regulation as an analogue to a contract for purchase of a good.188 And many
observers have read Smith as teaching that such contracts, reflecting rational choices of
consumers pursuing their own ends, end up benefiting society.189 CBA appears natural to many
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See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 10390, 10393
(Neil J Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds. 2001) (defining natural law as being derived from human nature and citing
Adam Smith as an important natural law thinker); Sofer, supra note 61, at 2394 (natural law literature emphasizes an
“analogy between discovering moral laws by reasoning and discovering the natural laws of science.”). See
generally HACKNEY, supra note 57, at 25 (explaining how Blackstone’s natural law philosophy embraced laissezfaire and anticipated Adam Smith); JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF
KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 212 (1929) (arguing that laissez-faire is a logical conclusion from natural law precepts).
185
Cf. GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 158-59 (characterizing an “unnatural” economic advantage as one
that is “non-market-based”).
186
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences
into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 882-83 (1999) (describing Lochner
as the “symbolic high point of Smithian freedom of contract”).
187
See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; BAXTER, supra note 28, at 10-12.
188
See Driesen, supra note 15, at 577; GOWDY & O’HARA, supra note 104, at 104-108.
189
Cf. DiMatteo, supra note 186, at 877-882 (arguing that Smith’s notion of free contract was not
limited to the economic efficiency model and included a concept of just contracting).
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of its advocates, because it reflects the same sort of logic found in the natural order represented
by contract.190
Moreover, demands for regulatory reform reflect a broader movement toward less
government, based upon a faith in markets owing a great debt to Adam Smith.191 Regulatory
reform thus forms part of a broader move toward laissez-faire, even though neoclassical
economics does not recommend the wholesale abandonment of environmental regulation.
Yet, many of the legal academics who embrace regulatory reform, unlike the Lochner-era
Justices, have explicitly rejected aspects of the economic theory supporting their preferred
reforms. Thus, Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, and Matthew Adler deny that aggregation of
consumer preferences forms an adequate basis for regulation, even though aggregation of
preferences forms the basis of the economic theory underlying CBA.192 Nevertheless, they all
conclude that CBA is justified.193

190

See James A. Dorn, The Case for Market Liberalism, Cato Institute, available at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-20-04.html (Jan. 20, 2004) (describing free market liberalism as “natural”).
191
See McGarity, supra note 37, at 1484-1498 (discussing the commitment of various regulatory
reform groups to less government and linking the “radical anti-interventionists’” views to Adam Smith).
192
See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 324 (supporting CBA but disapproving a willingness-topay approach to estimating benefits); Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 196 (rejecting reliance on “unrestricted
preferences” as the basis for valuing costs and benefits); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 253 (stating that CBA would be
undesirable if it lead to economic efficient outcomes based on willingness to pay). See also McGarity, supra note
13, at 10 (1998) (identifying Professor Sunstein as a proponent of a “softer” variety of CBA that that offered by
“free marketers”).
193
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 25-26 (basing his support for CBA on “common sense informed
by behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, rather than neoclassical economics); Adler & Posner, Welfarist
Theory, supra note 44, at 289-302 (linking individual welfare to overall well being that Alder identifies with CBA);
Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 194-95 (arguing that CBA tends to advance overall well-being). Professor
Adler’s support for CBA is subtle and sometimes equivocal. See Matthew D. Alder, The Positive Political Theory
of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment on Johnston, 150 U PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2002) (recognizing that CBA
may reduce overall well being); Adler, Judge Williams, supra note 44, at 271 (supporting CBA but characterizing
his support for CBA as “more tentative” than that of Judge Williams). Cf. Driesen, supra note 24, at 69-75
(questioning whether Adler and Posner’s “overall well being” theory adequately supports a choice for CBA).

37

Natural law remains at least as influential as it was during the Lochner period, but its
influence in the courtroom has waned significantly.194 Natural law today animates the law and
economics movement, which tends to believe regulation will prove counterproductive because it
interferes with the natural order represented by free markets.195 But the Court, while continuing
at times to venerate common law models, does not use natural law to justify contemporary
deregulation.
In place of natural law, we find a new kind of legal historicism, which emphasizes
positive law sources as the basis for neutrality. Hence, textualism and originalism have become
influential in Constitutional interpretation.196
C. Attitudes Toward Legislation

194

See Mootz, supra note 61, at 311 (referring to natural law as “a curiosity outside the
mainstream”); Soper, supra note 61, at 2403-04 (describing the unacceptability to society of having a Supreme
Court Justice “branded” as a “believer in natural law.”).
195
See generally HACKNEY, supra note 57, at 25 (identifying allegiance to natural law governing
economic relations with the view that “any attempt to intervene. . . was necessarily doomed to failure.”); Samuel J.
Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Healthand-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1793 (2002) (“Risk tradeoff analysis began as a tool of
deregulation.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); RISK VERSUS RISK:
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener eds.
1995); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK (1992); Ralph L.
Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANAL. 147 (1990); AARON WILDAVSKY,
SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (Social Philosophy and Policy Center 1988); Aaron Wildavsky , Richer is Safer, 60 PUB.
INT. 23 (1980)
196
See Adam Liptak, A Court Remade in Reagan Era’s Image, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2006, at A19
(discussing the Court’s growing commitment to original intent and textualism); Jonathan G. O’Neall, Raoul Berger
and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 281 (2001) (concluding that Raoul Berger’s originalist
scholarship has compelled constitutional law and theory to grapple with “the originalist proposition”). Cf. Robert
M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 134 (2002) (finding
that text has little impact and intent has no impact on Supreme Court decisions); Richard S. Kay, Originalist Values
and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 335, 335 (1995) (claiming that that originalism
describes an adjudication method identified and debated only in the last twenty years). See generally ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (a polemic on behalf of
originalism); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 60 (1994)
(characterizing Justice Scalia as “one of the Court’s foremost exponents” of originalism); STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION: RACE, RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED 21(1994) (pointing out that
“virtually every” Supreme Court Justice has, “at one time or another,” invoked originalist arguments).
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As suggested previously, clearer and more significant parallels with Lochnerism appear
when we look beyond the modern judiciary. For modern regulatory reformers’ attitudes toward
regulation closely resemble those of the Lochner-era Court.
1. Favoring Neutrality
We have seen that the Lochner-era Court tended to view “class legislation” with
suspicion and supported more neutral general legislation. Indeed, in the anti-trust cases the
Court converted class legislation into neutral legislation, by misinterpreting trust-busting laws as
authorizing injunctions against labor as well as business.
Modern regulatory reformers echo this opposition to “class legislation” when they decry
the one-sidedness of legislation favoring protection of the public’s health over the interests of
polluters. While they do not explicitly frame their opposition in “class legislation” terms, a
provision like section 109 of the Clean Air Act197 takes resources from A (the polluter) and gives
them to B (the breather) in the form of health protection.198 In doing so, the legislation corrects a
power imbalance that makes breathers helpless in protecting their own health from pollution
absent government intervention, a power imbalance similar to that which the New York
legislature sought to correct in employment relations when it sought to limit bakers’ working
hours. Cass Sunstein refers to class legislation protecting breathers from polluters as absolutist,
thus suggesting that one-sided legislation is irrational, even though as one of the moderate voices
in the regulatory reform movement, he suggests that absolutism might be justified in a few case

197

42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
Section 109 requires EPA to establish standards for ambient air quality sufficient to protect public
health. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000). Once it does this, states must devise plans, which include binding emission
control obligations for polluters, to meet these standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64-68 (1975) (describing the basics of the Clean Air Act scheme). These state standards,
passed as part of the effort to achieve the national ambient air quality standards, force polluters to install pollution
control devices or employ other changes that cost them money, but improve the health of those inhaling their
emissions.
198
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(such as protection of endangered species).199 The suggestion that one-sided legislation is not
just a value choice, but an irrational act is consistent with Lochnerism.
Both the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers often regard one-sided
legislation as futile and therefore arbitrary. To justify its holding that limits on baker’s hours
were unreasonable, the Lochner Court speculated that such limits might prove counterproductive
in terms of their own objectives. Specifically, the Court claimed that limits on work hours
“might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support his family.”200 This argument
resembles a favorite theme of contemporary regulatory reformers, regulation’s potential to harm
the very people it seeks to protect. They frequently argue that environmental, health, and safety
regulation can make its beneficiaries ill by reducing wealth or through direct health and
environmental risks created through responses to regulation.201 Even though Professor
McGarity, a leading environmental scholar, has sharply questioned the richer is safer argument
against stringent regulation,202 the Supreme Court characterized the argument as “unquestionably
true” in American Trucking.203
199

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 213-14 (2002)
(suggesting that a rights based approach might properly apply to the Endangered Species Act); Sunstein, supra note
195, at 1534 (contrasting balancing with absolutism); Cass R. Sunstein, From Consumer Sovereignty to Cost-Benefit
Analysis: An Incompletely Theorized Agreement, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB POL’Y 203, 209 (1999) (claiming that the
absolutism characterizing 1970s legislation “makes no sense); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 300 (characterizing many
current statutes as calling for “absolutism”). See also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 742 (1999) (arguing that public hysteria unduly influences regulation);
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 35-36 (1993) (same).
200
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. See generally Balkin, supra note 67, at 196 (referring to the argument
that economic regulation will hurt the very people they are designed to protect as “a standard individualist
argument.”)
201
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 136-41; ROBERT HAHN ET AL., DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS
REDUCE MORTALITY?, 6-11 (2000) (arguing that federal regulations can increase mortality); Sunstein, supra note
195; Graham & Wiener, supra note 195; BREYER, supra note 199, at 23 (claiming that the costs of environmental
cleanup can deprive individuals of income and lead to poor diet, heart attacks, and suicide); VISCUSI, supra note
195; Keeney, supra note 195; WILDAVSKY, supra note 195.
202
See McGarity, supra note 13, at 42-49 (refuting the richer is safer idea).
203
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 466 (2001) (characterizing the argument that
the “economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the
health gains” from cleaning the air as “unquestionably true.”). See also Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823,
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Scholars supporting CBA have portrayed it as a neutral reform, and made claims about its
neutrality central to their case for it.204 Professor Sunstein, for example, argues that CBA will
encourage agencies to make some regulations stricter and others more lenient, thus suggesting
that it has a neutral effect.205 He also argues that CBA improves priority setting, thereby
suggesting that it does not so much weaken environmental protection as refocus it.206 In spite of
industry’s consistent support of CBA, Professor Sunstein, along with others, argues that CBA
reduces special interest influence over legislation.207 Professor Gilman has identified concerns
about special interest influence as a major reason for the Court’s embrace of “general legislation”
both during and before the Lochner period.208 Thus, both contemporary regulatory reformers
and the Lochner-era Justices view neutral general legislation as an antidote to special interest
influence.

826 (7th Cir. 1993) (costs of rule for medical establishment will raise costs and reduce demand for medical services,
which may kill people); Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams J.
concurring) (arguing that costly regulation can kill more people than it saves by reducing wealth). Cf. Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (characterizing the Endangered Species Act’s goal as avoiding “needless
economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursing their environmental
objectives.”).
204
See Sinden, supra note 13, at 1416 (economists have touted CBA as a “politically `neutral’
means” of resolving policy disputes).
205
SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 137 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is for everyone); Sunstein,
supra note 21, at 2265 (supporting statement that “people with diverse views” should support CBA with examples
of CBA producing “more rapid and stringent regulation”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 26-27 (citing examples of
CBA causing “more rapid and stringent regulation.”).
206
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000)
(portraying CBA as a way of improving priority setting); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 257-260 (discussing the need
to reallocate resources to reduce inconsistency and misallocation of resources). See also David M. Driesen, Getting
Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10001,
10011 (2001) (explaining that the regulatory reformers’ emphasis on improved priority setting conveys a false sense
of neutrality); BREYER, supra note 199, at 10-23 (arguing that risk regulation suffers from poor priority setting). Cf.
McGarity, supra note 13, at 34 (questioning that notion that relaxing regulatory stringency helps fund more
important health priorities); Driesen, supra at 10017-18 (questioning the link between uneven dollars per life saved,
CBA, and priority setting).
207
SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 107; Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1174 (2001) (providing a theory explaining why CBA might discourage special
interest influence).
208
See GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 10 (describing the standards guiding Lochner-era jurisprudence as
hostile to legislation advancing “the special or partial interests of particular groups or classes.”)
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The regulatory reformers’ neutrality ideal includes an ideal of general legislation, since
they view CBA as a broadly applicable reform.209 Mathew Adler and Eric Posner likewise
convey support for something akin to general legislation when they argue that CBA improves
“overall well-being.”210 By identifying overall well-being as a goal for regulation they imply
that CBA leads to objectively desirable outcomes, thereby supporting its neutrality. The overall
well-being concept suggests that government officials can avoid making value choices favoring
one interest over another.211 The legislator need not choose between protecting the public health
and the environment and protecting industry from regulations’ burdens.212 Instead, their concept
suggests that an abstract state exists that provides an objectively better outcome.213 Properly
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See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 270 (discussing proposals to impose CBA on agency rulemaking
under all regulatory statutes); William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative
Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 298 (1996) (same).
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See Adler & Posner, supra note 25, at 194-95.
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Indeed, Professor Adler has gone so far as to argue that “Congress doesn’t choose values, it
chooses actions.” See Adler, supra note 12, at 120. This suggestion is, however, quite questionable. For example,
the Congressional directive that EPA set air quality standards protecting public health, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000),
takes no direct action limiting pollution. Instead, Congress chose a value to guide EPA decisions about what levels
of ambient air quality to demand. The EPA decisions setting numerical air quality standards, which constitute
actions in a legal sense, do not themselves improve air quality. Rather, they establish goals for state air quality
programs that impose legal requirements that mandate pollution reductions. David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes
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See SUNSTEIN, supra note 199, at 113 (CBA should be contentious because it “does not take a
stand on highly controversial questions of what government ought to do.”).
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proponents of CBA because they do address issues of value, albeit in an abstract way suggestive of neutrality. See
Adler, supra note 12, at 144 (describing “overall welfare” as a “particular value”); Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 592-94 (2004)
(explaining that the overall well-being theory involves comparison of objective values advanced or hindered by
government regulation and that CBA’s link to overall well-being is contingent). On the other hand, Professor Adler
has recently rejected the idea that deontological choices could trump the consequentialism undergirding CBA, which
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conducted CBA, in their view, offers, in all likelihood, a neutral method for achieving an
objectively desirable end.214
Some judicial support likewise exists for the idea of CBA as a kind of desirable general
legislation, as opposed to class legislation empowering “special interests.” In the previously
discussed Lockout/Tagout Decision,215 the D.C. Circuit suggested that the nondelegation doctrine
requires that statutes provide both a “floor” – a principle establishing a minimum protection level
- and a “ceiling”- a principle limiting a regulation’s maximum stringency - to appropriately guide
agency decisions.216 This approach suggests that statutes should assure that agencies write
regulations that are neither too strict nor too lenient.217 The Lockout/Tagout court clearly
indicated that CBA’s use saves the statute from any constitutional difficulty by allowing an evenhanded approach. This ruling suggests that an approach that made a clear value choice would
pose a constitutional problem, but that a neutral approach (CBA) would pass muster.218 The
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29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988).
216
See International Union, UAW v. OSHA (Lockdown/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
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nondelegation doctrine. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 359 (stating that the question of whether the Act sets “floors
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the D.C. Circuit case law.
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Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1321 (remanding to the agency to cure the nondelegation difficulty
rather than invalidating the statute because the statute “can reasonably be read as requiring” CBA).
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reasoning employed suggests that class legislation favoring workers at the expense of employers
was constitutionally suspect and must be subject to some sort of constraint.
2. Hyperrationality
Modern regulatory reformers, like the Lochner-era Court, suggest that regulators should
give compelling reasons for their decisions, rather than meet minimum requirements of bare
rationality.219 CBA’s use of quantification leads its supporters to believe that CBA will provide
very compelling, indeed mathematical, justifications for precise line drawing. This belief
undergirds the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in American Trucking Associations v. EPA.220 The court
chided EPA for interpreting section 109 of the Clean Air Act in a way that failed to constrain the
stringency or the laxness of potential standards.221 It then held that section 109 of the Act, as
interpreted by EPA, failed to provide a “determinate criterion” for setting standards and therefore
offended the nondelegation doctrine.222 This holding suggested, especially when read in
conjunction with the earlier ruling in Lockout/Tagout, which it discussed, that CBA could
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See Adler, supra note 12; Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1528 (arguing that an agency has a
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175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d sub. nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001).
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Id. at 1036-37 (reviewing EPA’s approach and characterizing it as leaving EPA free to “pick any
point between zero and hair below the concentrations yielding London’s Killer Fog.”)
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Id. at 1034-38 (pointing out that “EPA lacks . . . any determinate criterion for drawing lines” and
concluding that EPA offers no “intelligible principle,” as required by the nondelegation doctrine).
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provide this determinate principle, if allowed by Congress.223 Thus, the image of CBA providing
a neutral algorithm for determining standards informed the court’s judgment that the Clean Air
Act violated the nondelegation doctrine for want of a determinate principle.
The reasoning that the Lochner-era Court used to strike down economic legislation as
unreasonable under the due process clause closely resembles the reasoning CBA advocates use
to urge their favorite reform upon the polity. This similarity was strikingly evident in Professor
Tribe’s American Trucking brief. Professor Tribe argued that administrative decision-making
without consideration of cost was unreasonable in order to support a request for a presumption
that Congress intends to mandate the consideration of cost, absent a clear contrary statement in
the statute.224 Industry and scholars supporting its position have employed similar arguments
about the unreasonableness of alternatives to CBA in seeking to persuade Congress to enact costbenefit statutes.
For example, both the Lochner-era Court and regulatory reformers frequently use
difficulties in justifying precise line drawing to question regulation’s rationality. Thus, as we
have seen, the Lochner Court called the conclusion that 10 hours of work does not endanger
223

In American Trucking, the court remanded to EPA to allow that agency to construct an intelligible
principle saving the statute from being struck down. Id. at 1038 (remanding to offer EPA “an opportunity to extract
a determinate standard on its own.”). It then stated that it had mentioned cost-benefit analysis as a possible
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CBA was desirable. International Union, UAW v. OSHA (Lockout/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317-21 (D.C. Cir.
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For it recognized that its prior decisions had read section 109 as “barring EPA from considering” costs. American
Trucking, 175 F.2d at 1038.
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health, but 10 and a half hours does “entirely arbitrary”.225 And in Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital226 the Court found it impossible to understand how a board charged with defining a
minimum wage adequate to provide for womens’ welfare could use such a general criterion to
come up with a precise number, and therefore assumed that the board must have “brought
different factors into the problem” than those mentioned in the governing statute.227 Professor
Tribe’s General Electric Brief similarly claimed that implementing a directive to protect public
health is impossible because scientific information cannot “definitively determine” a precise
numerical air quality standard.228 EPA therefore must have considered a statutorily extraneous
factor, namely cost, argued General Electric.229 Both the Lochner-era Court and the modern
regulatory reformers tend to assume that something improper, or at least extra-statutory, must be
going on when a convincing explanation for a numerical regulatory standard does not appear.
Both embrace an expansive view of arbitrary regulation as including any regulation lacking a
very convincing explanation for very difficult judgments about precise line drawing.
Both the Lochner-era Court and modern regulatory reformers often treat a failure to
weigh all pros and cons as unreasonable. Thus, the Adkins Court cited an administrative
agency’s failure to consider the cost to an employer of providing a minimum wage as a reason to
find a minimum wage law arbitrary.230 CBA advocates’ arguments challenging the rationality of
1970s environmental legislation because of its alleged failure to consider cost echoes the
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approach to reasonableness review in the Lochner-era substantive due process cases. Both tend
to treat policy choices that do not weigh costs and benefits as irrational.231
D. CBA: Then and Now
We have seen that the Lochner-era Court, like modern regulatory reformers, relied
heavily on CBA. Justice Holmes’ accusation that the Lochner Court sought to pursue a laissezfaire vision might lead one to suppose that modern regulatory reformers are much less extreme
than the Lochner Court. For most modern regulatory reformers do not seek to repeal health and
environmental regulation outright, they simply wish to subject it to a cost-benefit test.232 This
reflects modern economic theories’ endorsement of regulation of “externalities,” problems that
contracting parties may create for third parties that are not internalized in prices.233
But the parallel between the Lochner Court and the modern neoclassical position is more
extensive than the Holmes dissent suggests. Professor Hovenkamp has explained that the
Lochner Court permitted regulation of businesses where externalities exist.234 And, as we saw in
Part II, the Court generally subjected much of this regulation to something resembling a costbenefit test.
It might seem surprising that modern regulatory reform bears any resemblance to
Lochnerism. But reflection suggests a simple reason for the rough similarity. For all its
sophistication, modern regulatory reform forms part of a broad political and intellectual
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movement that venerates free markets and distrusts government, even though some of the more
thoughtful regulatory reformers part company with this broader agenda and set of beliefs in some
respects.235 It is not too surprising that contemporary attitudes toward legislation and regulation
would resemble, to some extent, those of powerful adherents of an earlier anti-regulatory
movement.236 And those attitudes might tend to influence legal practice and thinking. The next
section explores this similarity’s significance for modern regulatory reform.
IV. Implications for the Regulatory Reform Debate
While the Lochner period jurisprudence still has a poor reputation with most scholars and
with the sitting Justices, some academics have defended it.237 The existence of some parallels
between modern regulatory reform and Lochnerism condemns neither. But the parallelism, even
with all of its limits, gives us a broader view of regulatory reform, and therefore leads to new
insights that should form part of the regulatory reform debate.
A. Hyper-rationalism
Some concerns about hyper-rationalism have formed part of the regulatory reform debate.
One can view oft-expressed concerns that “soft variables” (such as difficult to quantify
environmental values) will receive short shrift under CBA as a concern about hyper-
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rationalism.238 We need more discussion of rationality’s limits and the relationship between
rationality and CBA. Is it really possible to comprehensively consider everything and still
produce a non-arbitrary reason for a particular action? How can an agency non-arbitrarily give
substantial weight to non-quantifiable variables when operating in a cost-benefit framework?
Does CBA provide a mechanism to generate convincing explanations for precise line drawing?
Or instead, will CBA create an illusion that convincing explanations are possible without
delivering a mechanism, thereby leading to results like that found in Adkins and in the D.C.
Circuit’s American Trucking opinion, where the failure to provide a strong justification for a
particular number in a regulation led to invalidation?239 Finally, does CBA advance rationality
or does it hide its limits in poorly reasoned decisions about cost-benefit methodology?240 This
Article cannot answer these questions, but the analogy with Lochnerism reveals the role of
demands for heightened rationality and therefore highlights the importance of these questions.
Just as Lochnerian attitudes led to rather strict scrutiny of economic legislation, Lochnerian
regulatory reform ideas may encourage heightened scrutiny of administrative agency
regulations,241 which raises a host of issues worthy of more attention.
B. Neutral Law and Administrative Agencies
The insight that Lochnerism and regulatory reform share a set of attitudes toward
government regulation suggests questions about the role of neutrality ideals in regulatory reform.
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Should regulatory analysis aid implementation of legislative value choices or implement instead
a natural law vision of ideal regulation? Does the very idea of a legislative value choice imply
that agencies may not engage in open-ended consideration of all costs and benefits of proposed
actions? This subsection explores some of these issues.
Regulatory reformers want CBA to guide administrative agency decisions, since agencies
make many important decisions about how much environmental, health, and safety protection to
offer.242 This poses a problem in terms of the ideal of neutral origins for law. Just as we expect
judicial decisions adjudicating constitutional law claims to reflect some reasonable interpretation
of the Constitution, we expect administrative decisions to reflect reasonable interpretations of
relevant statutes.243 CBA’s natural law origins in economic theory may make it legitimate in the
eyes of some academics, but a court or administrative body’s legitimacy hinges on a narrower
sense of neutrality. These bodies must, insofar as possible, make decisions having detectable
origins in the decisions of a superior positivist authority, namely the legislature.
While some commentators seem to assume that CBA is compatible with following a
variety of legislative directions, it is not clear that this is so. American Trucking suggests that
CBA can be incompatible with the principle that administrative agencies accept Congressional
value choices. The American Trucking Court rejected the consideration of cost in section 109,
because Congress directed EPA to protect public health.244 If EPA were to decline to protect
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public health, because it believed that the costs of protecting public health outweighed the
benefits, it would clearly have violated the mandate to protect public health.245
Indeed, when Congress lists factors that an agency must consider in setting standards,
such as the factor of public health, considering other factors violates the law.246 In Department
of Transportation v. Citizens for Overton Park, the Department of Transportation argued that it
should be able to employ CBA in deciding whether to put a highway through a state park.247 But
the governing statute required the agency to route highways around parks if feasible.248 The
Supreme Court held that broad consideration of CBA involved a failure to follow the
Congressional policy, and therefore constituted arbitrary and capricious rulemaking.249
Similarly, Congressional directives to realize the maximum feasible reductions of
pollution, which are found in numerous statutory provisions,250 contemplate the consideration of
cost, but they do not authorize CBA.251 Such provisions arguably require that the agency
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maximize feasible reductions.252 If EPA gave up a feasible reduction, presumably one that the
regulated companies could produce without closing down, because it thought that the costs of
maximum feasible reductions outweighed the benefits, it may have violated a statute that
embodies such a mandate.253
An agency, however, should consider CBA when the governing statute requires it to
weigh costs against benefits or to achieve a particular relationship between costs and benefits
(e.g. benefits should not greatly outweigh costs).254 It should do so because CBA produces
relevant information for its decision.
In general, Overton Park suggests that agencies should conduct directly targeted analysis,
i.e., analysis designed to illuminate only the factors governing statutory provisions make
relevant. Conducting a broader analysis can only conform to Overton Park if the broader
analysis is not considered. And it makes no sense to waste time and money on an analysis that
cannot be considered, when a more focused intensive analysis of relevant factors is an available
alternative.255
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The argument that agencies should “consider” CBA in some indeterminate matter, with
no reference to the content of statutes governing agencies, suggests a rejection of a positivist rule
of law in favor of natural law. For the heart of a positivist rule of law, at least in the
administrative law area, involves agencies implementing Congressional views about wise policy
and conducting analysis that targets the considerations Congress made relevant through the value
choices in the implementing legislation.
Some of the legal scholars supporting regulatory reform, however, have a model of
expert decision-making in mind, rather than natural law.256 This would place them in the
company of progressive opponents of Lochnerism.257 Still, their view remains in some tension
with the notion of legislative value choice that emerged in the post-Lochner era. The insight that
regulatory reformers’ position undermines a positivist view of law leads to some new questions
even for these “modern mugwumps.”258 Can one have expert decision-making without value
choices? If there must be value choices, what is the justification for leaving them in the hands of
experts?259
Accepting a positivist approach would not necessarily eliminate all arguments for CBA.
It would, however, eliminate the many arguments that focus on CBA’s natural virtues. A
positivist analysis would only endorse CBA for legislative provisions embodying efficiency
values. But the Congresses of the 1970s, which enacted much of the corpus of modern
environmental, health, and safety statutes was not especially even-handed, and arguably showed
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little concern with economic efficiency.260 Thus, heeding the Lochner-era rejection of natural
law would bring a significant change in the regulatory reform debate, which has been much more
concerned with normative efficacy than interpretive plausibility.
The suggestion that Congress historically has not been much concerned with efficiency
leads to the question of whether Congress should require cost-benefit balancing. Should elected
representatives legislate with Lochnerian neutrality?
C. Legislation and Value Choice
Legislators create policy, rather than interpret others= policies.261 In the environmental
area, a prevalent economic dynamic makes remedial legislation especially appropriate. 262
Environmental problems do not remain static, but tend to get worse over time, because of the
fundamental tendencies of people to multiply and increase consumption, absent some
countervailing force.263 As consumption grows, makers of goods and services amass wealth that
enables them to weaken and sometimes fend off government efforts to limit pollution and natural
resource destruction.264 This tendency means that environmental law probably should not be
neutral; rather it should countervail environmentally destructive tendencies in unregulated
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markets. And it must be designed to function well under substantial monied pressure to become
ineffective.265 Powerful corporations play an important role today as they did during the time of
Lochner.266
As a general matter, legislative value choice is perfectly appropriate. It is fine for a
legislative body to choose between peace and war, between bilingual and English only
education, between welfare and workfare, between a graduated income tax and a flat tax,
between high tariffs and free trade.267 We elect legislatures precisely to establish non-neutral
principles reflecting the value choices of the representatives or their constituents.
While it may be appropriate for legislatures to make stark black and white choices, surely
legislatures may properly make more nuanced judgments about how to balance competing policy
considerations. It may decide to lock the prison doors and throw away the keys in response to
violent criminal offenses committed by adults of sound mind, but to authorize less punitive
treatment for juveniles or the insane.268 Congress may decide to protect some land as wilderness,
but permit limited logging on other lands.269
Because loss of health disables the victim from enjoying much of what life has to offer
and from contributing to society, giving primacy to preventing involuntary risks to health is a
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defensible value choice.270 Since the environment provides vital amenities and a life support
system,271 giving primacy to protecting the environment itself also is defensible.
Yet, in their details many environmental statutes embody some Congressional balancing
of competing considerations. I have argued elsewhere, for example, that the feasibility principle,
which animates numerous statutory provisions, reflects a Congressional decision to give primacy
to protecting health and the environment, except where doing so is likely to lead to widespread
plant closures producing significant unemployment.272 This principle may reflect a judgment
that firms should not subject people to involuntarily incurred health risks, except when plant
closures may create comparable risks of potentially debilitating unemployment.273 This
judgment offers a nuanced approach that requires an agency to balance competing concerns, but
does not pretend that quantification can avoid the need for a value judgment.274
These examples illustrate several things. Legislation should not remain neutral on the
issues it addresses. It is legitimate for legislation to be very one-sided. Even if it desirable for
legislation to be nuanced, the legislature may appropriately make value choices, rather than
delegate key value choices to agencies.
Legislatures may choose economic efficiency as a value for legislation (if one believes
that efficiency is a value).275 Such a value choice would appropriately lead to CBA. But

270

See Driesen, supra note 24, at 38-39 (explaining how injury to health can devastate individuals);
Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 177 (2001) (emphasizing the normative significance of the disruptive impact of injury upon
individuals).
271
See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917, 981-82 (2005) (describing the “ecosystem services” the environment supplies).
272
Driesen, supra note 24, at 9.
273
Id. at 35 (discussing the devastating effect unemployment can have on individuals).
274
Id. at 34-41.
275
See generally Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).

56

justification of a cost-benefit criterion requires the identification and defense of a value choice, a
task avoided when scholars treat CBA’s neutrality as itself an argument for its adoption.
The legitimacy of value choices also implies the legitimacy of “class legislation,” defined
as legislation that empowers some groups at the expense of others. Social security advances the
interests of the old at the expense of the young. Similarly, the Clean Air Act advances the
interests of breathers at the expense of the interests of industry. This favoritism does not cast
doubt on the legitimacy of the legislation, for legislative value choices must, in effect, favor
some groups over others. As a result, the regulatory reformers’ argument that CBA reduces the
influence of “special interests” should not count as a good argument for CBA. There is nothing
wrong with legislation that advances some interests at the expense of others. That is what
legislation is for.
The analysis offered above suggests that appeals to CBA’s neutrality provide scant
justification for it. Legislation properly involves value choices.
Conclusion
The debate about the future of environmental policy should address value choices and the
nature of the society we live in. Unfortunately, the image of CBA as a neutral rationalizing
reform akin to “general legislation” has appealed to the technocratic instincts of academics and
policy makers, but proven unhelpful in clarifying what value choices Congress should make in
shaping environmental policy. The analogy between Lochnerism and modern regulatory
reform, while incomplete, highlights the limits of neutral rubrics as a guide to policy.
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